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What it means to be modern: education, policy and New Labour 
Abstract 
This study examines the policy changes and continuities in the delivery of 
public education services both preceding and following the election of the 
Labour government in 1997. These involve the changing relationship 
between local and central government and the development of an 
enhanced role for the private sector in the management and delivery of 
education services. The study considers the limitations and possibilities 
of these developments and their implications for governance and 
performance through critical policy analysis and consideration of key 
texts, government publications and contemporary interviews with 
individuals within the policy process. 
The study is divided into chapters dealing with the context of the 
research in key literature and issues of change and continuity in national 
education policy. It includes a critical description of the approaches to the 
inspection of local education authorities and an illustrative example of 
government intervention in an LEA leading to the outsourcing of services. 
Through interview material, the policy analysis is grounded in the 
experience of individuals who are enacting 'modernisation' and also 
commenting on its effects. There is also a consideration of the evidence 
of the impact of outsourcing on school performance in a number of 
authorities. 
In addition, the study considers the implications of these developments 
for future strategy in relation to the development of local authorities in the 
light of the Children Act (2004). 
It suggests that the readiness of local authorities to adopt the changes 
needed to enact the Children Act (2004) forms a contrast to their limited 
adherence to the local government reforms prefigured elsewhere by 
central government. This reflects the strength of concepts such as the 
well-being of children as agents of change, in contrast to the diffuse 
theoretical underpinnings of the third way. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
This research engages with a contemporary and central issue regarding 
public education policy in England in relation to schools and local 
education authorities. This is the quest, undertaken by the Labour 
government elected in 1997, for improvement in pupil performance 
through a process described by government as 'modernisation By 
considering the concept of 'modern isation', the research forms part of the 
developing literature which seeks to explore and define the nature of policy 
making in education and the conceptual questions which are prompted by 
its study. 
It is, overall, a qualitative study, informed by personal experience gained 
from working at a senior level in a Local Education Authority (LEA) 
throughout the period of study. It also draws on published literature by 
other commentators and on primary sources The primary sources include 
material demonstrating the government's own policy iterations, for 
example government publications, Green and White Papers and 
Ministerial Statements. These are compared and contrasted with critical 
and analytical literature by other researchers. The primary sources also 
include interviews with individuals involved in the policy process and its 
enactment. This leads to an evaluation of policy and its effectiveness 
taking into account an illustrative example of intervention in a local 
education authority. 
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This process will use the technique of triangulation to explore what has 
been described as the 'contested terrain' (Ozga, 2000) of policy 
development and its study. Through this, the study seeks to discuss how 
policy can be identified and also evaluated, against which criteria and to 
what purpose. A range of diverse but relevant material, including 
documentation regarding the outsourcing of educational services, is 
analysed in order to develop a grounded account of the issues at play. At 
the centre is the search for the concept of 'modernisation' and its use by 
New Labour as a descriptor of policy change. 
As such this study contributes to debates about the nature of 
contemporary local democracy and the relationship of the national 
executive, which identifies itself with the creation of policy, to local 
government, which central government sees as charged with its 
implementation in order to achieve what has been described as holistic 
government (Wilkinson and Applebee, 1999). It argues that policy creation 
is in fact a more diffuse process than the government model and in the 
absence of an agreed and accepted concept of 'modernisation' has led to 
its compromise. Reform of the public services is an issue to which New 
Labour returns and has become both its aim and its justification in 
government in its second and third terms. In this way the study is of 
relevance to the study of political as well as educational development in 
the new millennium. 
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The Context of the Research 
'Modernisation' has been the characterising description and justification for 
the reform of public services by New Labour. The term has been self- 
ascribed by government to its policies and largely accepted as descriptive 
by those affected by it. Claiming through the electoral mandate to reflect 
the views of the nation, national government has deemed public services, 
with the explicit inclusion of education, to be in need of improvement. A 
range of performance measures and indicators have been devised by 
government agencies, and information collected to populate them, 
demonstrating the need for change against criteria and performance 
targets developed by government agencies and commissions. This has 
included extensive inspection of public education services, including 
schools and local education authorities, by the Office for Standards in 
Education (OFSTED). This change which government has sought to 
induce has been described as 'modernising' (Blair, 1997). The dissertation 
provides a critical description of the characteristic gestures and actions of 
modernisation and relates them to their philosophical and political roots. 
Fundamentally, the study examines the degree to which 'modernisation' 
is a 'rebranding exercise' (Taylor, 2002) or whether it consists of a 
coherent set of new and contemporary intentions translated into 
initiatives leading to discernible outcomes which in turn reflect policy 
intention. 
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In order to explore the concepts and processes which the term has 
absorbed, education policy is examined in two contexts. One places the 
reforms in their historical framework, tracing continuities and 
discontinuities from earlier attempts to change the organisational and 
political framework of public education. In addition to this, through an 
illustrative example of the outsourcing of the services of a local education 
authority, educational reform is placed within the context of personal 
history and testimony of those enacting modernisation so as to assess to 
what degree its reach is beyond legislation and enforcement into areas of 
culture and personal values. 
For this to be undertaken, attention is given to the theoretical 
underpinnings of modernisation, in particular the 'third way' theorising of 
Giddens (1998) and others. This critical analysis is drawn from the 
developing literature which traces the relationship between descriptions 
of modernisation and what Ball and others have characterised as 
I performativity' (Ball, 1998: Broadfoot, 2001). Consideration of the 
continuing elision of notions of the 'modern'with definitions of 
'effectiveness' in government pronouncements, justified by a rhetoric of 
'accountability', are central to the description. 
Fundamental to the development of modernisation has been the 
movement of power and responsibility within the education system. This 
has been broadly at three levels - national, local and institutional, with a 
more recent emphasis on the level of the individual learner through 
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notions of the 'persona lisation' of learning. The process of modernisation 
has involved the relocation of key elements of the educational delivery, 
management and planning processes within and between the main 
actors, along with relocations of accountability. This has contributed to 
the creation of an unstable set of relationships between those groupings, 
mirroring the underlying tensions between democratic accountability and 
market competitiveness. The redefinition of the nature and activity of 
schools, LEAs and government continues to be the product of attempts 
to reconcile these tensions. The government's intention that the concept 
of 'modern isation' will prove an integrative and justifying principle, 
resolving conflict through adherence to a shared commitment to 
improvement, is tested. 
This process has involved reconsidering issues of democratic legitimacy 
alongside the claimed operational effectiveness of different forms of 
service delivery. The search for school improvement has involved a 
relocation of the sources of professional insight and a shift in the political 
accountability for the education service between central and local 
government and teachers themselves. The thesis refers to the 
development of performance management as a method of control and 
direction for the education service, drawing together the multiple strands 
of performance management, at school and LEA level, creating a 
powerful methodology to ensure compliance. This is evidenced by the 
involvement of private sector organisations in the delivery of services 
which were once more or less exclusively provided directly by local 
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government. As government has harnessed performance, accountability 
and compliance to form a means of controlling the delivery and 
development of the service, I argue that it has produced a definition of 
'modernity' at some variance from its claimed liberal heritage within the 
'third way' renewal advocated by Giddens, (Giddens, 1998), more 
concerned with serving the supposed needs of the economy than 
advances in modern citizenship. 
The thesis therefore deals with a range of complex and competing 
concepts subsumed within the notion of 'modern isation'. These include 
the shifts in power and influence between central and local government 
and other institutions including schools; the development of performance 
measures and inspection as means of ensuring compliance with policy 
direction in the absence of professional assent; the tension between 
market based reforms and a new developing rhetoric around partnership 
and collaboration (Bridges and Husbands, 1996); and an underlying 
theoretical position based on a supposed liberal and inclusive approach 
to social reform and political renewal which requires authoritarian and 
interventionist structures to accomplish its ends. It describes the 'policy 
story' of the outsourcing of a local authority's education services from the 
perspectives of those closely involved in the process and reflects on its 
characteristics. 
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The meanings of 'modernisation' 
The ambition to 'modernise' the education service has been at the heart of 
government policy since its election in 1997 (Blair, 1997,1998). This 
ambition formed part of the perceived need to reform local government 
generally and related as much to issues of culture and values as it did to 
issues of structure. The government's vision included local government 
alongside other public services as in need of reform. Those reforms were 
linked to earlier changes, initiated by the preceding Conservative 
administration, and formed part of a continuous set of responses which 
preceded even that. This debate has its roots in the attempts to resolve 
the tensions and uncertainties within national government regarding the 
purpose, structure and organisation of the nation's education service 
which found voice in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Although a new set 
of terminology is being created to describe this process, which describes 
the creation of a 'knowledge economy' (Leadbeater, (1998) p. 11), and 
notions of a 'preventive, holistic and culture - changing government' (Perri, 
(1998) p. 62), the essential concepts and definitions of the issues to be 
addressed have remained persistently consistent. 
Outline of material 
The study is largely qualitative, containing a critical description of key 
events and chronologies to underpin the analysis. It involves the study of 
source material from central government, as well as current literature on 
the subject. Close attention is given to text and the comparison of policy 
over time and between documents. Textual study is complemented by 
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material gained from interviews with those engaged, in different roles, in 
the formulation and implementation of government education policy in a 
particular LEA. This evidence is compared and contrasted to investigate to 
what degree the 'surface' of policy is consistent with its underpinning 
concepts and values and of those engaged in its enactment. 
A focus of the interview material is a 'case in point' or illustrative example 
of an LEA subject to intervention by the Department for Education and 
Skills (DfES). A consistent feature of the 'modernisedway of working 
under New Labour has been the involvement of private sector providers in 
the delivery of public services. At the extreme of such policies has been 
the compulsory involvement of a private provider in the provision of all or 
some of a LEA's functions following 'failure' under inspection. In that 
process, some key characteristics of modernisation become apparent. 
These include increased emphasis on performance management, 
competition as a driver for improvement and the introduction of 
management or quasi-governance bodies alongside or in place of local 
democratic structures. 
Such an illustrative example enables a practical analysis to be made of the 
use made by New Labour of the means of enforcement of national policy 
at local level which it inherited from the previous government through the 
inspection of public services and of those it created to ensure that the 
change it required in an LEA was made. This is set within an analysis of 
the changing frameworks for inspection (Ofsted, 1999,2001,2002,2004) 
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and their outcomes in terms of judgement and action. Within the detail of 
that study, the continuities and discontinuities of perception of those 
involved in the enactment of policy are revealed and tentative conclusions 
reached as to the degree to which generalisation can be made on the 
evidence presented. 
This example, and other evidence, illustrates the developing relationship 
between the public and private sectors in relation to the provision of 
educational services. The arguments made in favour of the use of the 
private sector by government are contrasted with their mode of operation 
and impact on performance. An examination is made of the degree to 
which the myths and reality of modernisation are reflected in the rhetoric 
and performance of other agencies which are its practical embodiment. 
This is an area of study in which the work of a number of commentators on 
the implications of markets in education (for example Bridges and 
Husbands, 1996) can be evidenced. 
Fundamental issues such as values and democratic accountability are 
explored within that analysis. This is of current interest, given the 
continuing and developing scope of intervention within Councils and the 
relationship of judgements on performance within the education and more 
recently children's service to the judgements on the performance of the 
Council as a whole through the comprehensive performance assessment 
(CPA) of council effectiveness by the Audit Commission. This provides an 
insight into the breadth of the scope of modernisation and the degree to 
10 
which it creates democratic renewal or offers ideological responses to 
questions which are essentially managerial. 
Key issues and research questions 
The aims of the study are to provide critical insights into the development 
of government policy in relation to the education service and in particular 
in relation to schools. This is important as a major government priority 
and focus for government activity. As such it is impacting on every young 
person and family in England. The dissertation seeks to get beyond the 
surface of policy - as recognisable in, for example, policy statements and 
legislation - to see what is really at play in terms of definitions, values 
and priorities. 
The dissertation takes pronouncements and decisions by government 
and places them within the framework outlined by government as 
justification for the changes to structure, responsibility and process within 
the system it is promoting. It subjects that justification to an analysis of its 
internal consistency and roots within earlier policy. This involves the 
forming of judgements on the extent to which the policies and initiatives 
offer genuinely new aims and seek new means of achieving them or 
whether what is offered is different in presentation but not in substance. 
A number of other perspectives, drawn from other commentators, are 
employed to test the strength and consistency of the government project. 
The study offers a view of the likely consequences of reform and its 
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possible future developments. It will have as its focus education at the 
local level. The role and position of LEAs, Children's Services Authorities 
(CSAs), and their relationship to schools and with central government 
and its agencies are therefore closely examined. This leads to reflections 
on the relationship of modernisation to notions of democracy. 
The objectives of the study therefore flow from the aims. They are to offer 
a detailed description of policy development, as well as a critical 
overview of other research and commentary along with the description of 
an illustrative example of intervention (as an exemplar of modernisation 
in its most extreme manifestation). In this instance, the intervention 
presented involves the progressive outsourcing of a local authority's 
education service following adverse judgements by external inspection. It 
shows the coming together of a number of policy streams. These include 
performance management through inspection, definition of improvement 
through target setting, the priority given to supposed operational 
effectiveness over democratic legitimacy and the preference for market 
solutions over co-operative ones. This provides opportunity for a critical 
consideration of the nature of policy and its study. 
Through this, the key questions surrounding the definition of the nature of 
modernisation can be explored. These questions are: 
- whether modernisation is a new set of intentions and actions or a 
representation of earlier ones; 
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whether modernisation exists as a coherent policy beyond its rhetoric 
and, if so, what are its instruments of operation; 
whether modernisation has the capacity to produce transformation 
within the public provision of an education service; and 
- whether modernisation is active as a concept in the beliefs and 
actions of those performing within the framework it creates. 
This provides for an assessment of the degree to which the values and 
intentions of those implementing policy have a crucial and controlling 
impact on those outcomes. The degree to which there is dissonance 
between the values and aims of policy may control the success or 
otherwise of the policy intervention. It is key within this analysis to assess 
whether policy constitutes, in reality, the sum actions of individuals 
resolving conflicts of ideology, expectation and personal values at 
specific times. 
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Chapter Two 
Research strategy and methodology 
In this chapter I outline the approach I have taken to this study, relating the 
research questions I have formulated to the strategies I have taken to find 
answers to them. These involve the consideration of policy documents, the 
work of other researchers and commentators and first hand study through 
the interviewing of a number of individuals involved in the outsourcing of 
the educational service of a local education authority. I describe the use I 
have made of research techniques, in particular triangulation, and the 
potential impact on the study of the engagement of the researcher. 
The premise of the methodology for this study is that there is no single 
academic discipline appropriate for the study of education policy. Rather it 
is an area where a number of disciplines can find areas of common 
interest and indeed that this interrelationship is necessary in order to 
develop a grounded understanding of policy making and its 
implementation. This approach reflects the position explored by Young 
(1999) who describes a 'crisis in the sociology of education' stemming 
from a realisation that'sociology of education reflected an out-of-date view 
of the specialisation of knowledge in education studies' (p. 35). He goes on 
to argue for a 'connective rather than insular specialisation as the basis for 
educational studies' (p. 35). Within this area of connected study he reflects 
on the relationship between research and policy: 
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'While making and implementing policy is clearly a distinct activity 
from research and analysis and no positive purpose is served by 
trying to conflate them, they are not un related..... education is 
inescapably a practical activity and that therefore there can be no 
such thing as research geared solely to understanding; ultimately 
research can only have meaning if it contributes to changing 
practice. It follows that critique cannot be entirely separate from 
policy or practice; research depends on policy and practice for its 
topic'. 
(Young, 1999, p. 36). 
In making his own linkages between research, policy and implementation, 
Young is extending his connective specialisation beyond the set of 
academic disciplines to allow for the inclusion of other sets of experience 
and understanding drawn from the inescapably practical activity of 
implementing education policy itself. However, such an inclusive approach 
brings with it its own disciplines and in itself does not negate the value of 
individual methods of study. He comments: 
I education research has certainly got to ask some hard questions 
about its methodology, concepts and priorities and.... its links with 
teachers and policy makers.. ' (p. 31). 
The 'hard questions' have prompted a number of formulations about the 
stance of researchers towards the subject matter of policy. For example, 
Whitty claims: 
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I contemporary sociology of education can still make a useful 
contribution to understanding and developing education 
policy. '(Whitty, 2002, p. 26) 
Raab, on the other hand, saw his study of the sociology of education 
policy as at 
'the intersection of political science and educational studies in the 
formation of perspectives upon education policy... ' (Raab, in Halpin 
and Troyna, (ed), 1994, p. 17) 
Halpin himself argues that, 
I empirical approaches to the study of education policy do not have 
to be explicitly sociological before they can be either insightful or 
informative.. ' (Halpin, in Halpin and Troyna, (ed), 1994, p. 200). 
The common ground here is the absence of any discipline having 
hegemony over the area of study. For Whitty, sociology of education is 
making a 'useful contribution; for Raab 'intersection' was important; for 
Halpin the key was the degree to which approaches were 'insightful or 
informative'. 
However, although the acknowledgement that the study of policy was one 
where different approaches could find their place was welcome, the 
danger of study without a clear discipline or method is lack of focus or 
outcome. In this context I wanted to produce a piece of work which was 
not simply descriptive, (a policy history approach), or one which sought to 
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place education policy wholly within other policy or political fields, (a policy 
science approach), nor indeed one which sought to regard education 
policy simply as a field in which larger issues of class and power are 
disputed, (a quasi Marxist approach). Rather I wished to be able to draw 
on those approaches without being exclusively contained within any. The 
intention is a paper which is conscious of theory without in itself being 
theoretical. 
This leads to a research strategy which seeks to draw on a range of 
different sources: other published policy scholarship, government 
documents in the form of Green and White Papers , including WES 
publications between 1997 and 2005, and Acts of Parliament regarding 
education and local government more generally, including DETR guidance 
on the Local Government Act 1999 (DETR 1999), policy pamphlets and 
speeches by politicians, with particular reference to Callaghan and Blair, 
Ofsted inspection reports, other reports in the name of Her Majesty's Chief 
Inspector of Schools in England, advice from mentors and data collected 
from those involved, one way or another, in enacting policy, through 
interview. 
This information is necessarily diffuse and differentiated. The process of 
study sought to draw that together around key themes, primarily that of 
I modernisation' but also its related issues of performance, governance and 
the intersection of the public and private domains in the education 
enterprise. In drawing that information together, a range of perspectives 
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and insights would emerge, giving a grounded 'real world' account of some 
aspects of education policy under New Labour. 
Rationale for the illustrative example and its construction 
The place of the illustrative example of modernisation in action is central to 
the study for a number of reasons. 
First, in the absence of any explicit definition of 'modernisation' in 
government literature, but the frequent use of 'modernising' as a 
descriptor, an attempt to understand its nature needs to look at one of its 
most visible aspects - the delivery of complex public services by private 
contractors at the direction of central government. The outsourcing event 
forms the intersection of a number of strands of government policy. These 
are: the strand of published inspection reports on LEAs, itself part of a 
larger stream of activity aimed at developing public or'consumer' 
awareness of the quality of public services and, through 'naming and 
shaming', improving them; the strand of local government reform, leading 
to a pressure on councils to see themselves as less about the direct 
delivery of services and more about their procurement on behalf of the 
community; the strand of increasing emphasis on performance and 
outcomes leading to a belief that the aims of an education service can be 
specified in attainment outcomes and hence be made the subject of 
contract; and also the desire by Government never to be seen to be 
powerless, always to have an executive action available to it, at least in 
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relation to local government. At the source of such concern is the 
institutional memory within government of earlier difficulties with localities, 
including both local authorities and schools. These include difficulties for 
Callaghan's Labour government regarding a London primary school, 
William Tyndale, in which, it was claimed, discipline had collapsed 
because of adherence by the teachers to 'progressive' teaching methods 
(Gretton and Jackson, (1976)) and persistent difficulties for the Thatcher 
government with the Labour controlled Greater London Council. The study 
of intervention and outsourcing therefore can help to illumine the 
measures taken by central government to create sufficient means to limit 
the local electoral mandate and create *powers of intervention to secure 
the national will. 
Second, a feature of New Labour's educational preoccupation has been its 
rediscovery of the importance of urban education. This has been manifest 
in a number of schemes and projects, including Education Action Zones, 
Excellence in Cities programmes, and the establishment of Sure Start 
programmes in deprived wards as well as wider programmes such as New 
Deal for Communities. The intervention in LEAs can be seen in this 
context: all of the outsourced LEAs are metropolitan cities or boroughs, or 
inner or outer London boroughs. Intervention then is part of wider social 
and educational intentions regarding urban life. 
Third, while much of the study of policy concerned the 'big picture'of 
education policy, the case in point offered a chance to look at the 'little 
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picture'- the view of policy from the perspective of those who, by choice 
or otherwise, were enacting it. Since modernisation has cultural 
dimensions - it seeks to change values as well as behaviour - the 'little 
picture' could give insights into the degree to which a 'modern' 
professional sensibility was being created through new relationships and 
structures in a new sphere which was neither wholly private nor wholly 
public. 
Fourth, if 'policy' is theorised as process rather than document or 
substance, then the study of the 'arbitration of practice' (Raab, 1994) 
within the outsourced LEA may well be a contribution to the development 
of new policy thinking, in so far as the arbitration of policy creates it in new 
and localised forms. Raab notes- 
'the policy process in education embraces a vast range of sites of 
action and discourse, from central-government machinery through 
to places where practice is arbitrated..... Whether in its political or its 
educational culture, none of the points on the chain is a clone of 
any other at the same level. ' 
( Raab, in Halpin and Troyna, (ed), 1994, pp. 24 -5) 
Fifth, the issue was one of immediate personal and professional interest. I 
have worked in LEAs since the election of the first Thatcher government in 
1979 and since 1988 in senior positions in an economically deprived urban 
authority in the West Midlands. For eleven years I have had the job title, 
variously, of Director of Education, Co-ordinating Director of Lifelong 
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Learning and, since April 2005, Director for Children and Young People. 
During that time, two of my children have made their way through the 
comprehensive school system, higher education and into work. My third 
child entered a specialist sports college in September 2005. The policy 
developments in education since 1979 have been part of my personal, 
family and professional life. Having felt their impact, I wanted to 
understand them better. 
Further, given the underlying policy of Government, by one means or 
another, to introduce private contractors into most aspects of LEA 
operations, I was curious to know what it was like, how it felt, how it was 
different. Of particular interest was the client/contractor relationship and 
within that the place of a contract or other mechanism for engagement. 
Taking on the role of researcher into policy, rather than executive or 
saboteur, would offer a different line of sight, a set of new understandings 
of the professional and personal world I inhabit. 
In addition, as I read in and around the field, it became clear that while 
research had closely followed the government focus on the individual 
institution as the point of development, relatively little had been written 
about the consequent changes of culture and practice within LEAs. There 
was an apparent gap in the research literature. Since working in that area 
had been a large part of my professional life, the process would enable me 
to use my own experience as both subject and, to a degree, as object of 
the research. 
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It would be too ambitious to compare this approach too closely with the 
'vulture's eye' metaphor, used by Whitty to characterise a distinctively 
sociological way of looking at educational issues: 
'Apparently a vulture is able always to keep the background 
landscape in view while enlarging its object of immediate interest. 
(Whitty, in Power and others, 2003, p-4) 
However, the study seeks to use personal experience and 'the case in 
point' to link the 'little picture' of personal biographies, motivation and hope 
to the 'big picture' of national policy. Through doing this, an additional 
perspective on the modernisation of the education service would be 
described. 
Collection of data 
The case in point, a study of outsourcing in a metropolitan LEA, takes into 
account information from a variety of sources. Central to that was the 
series of published inspection reports from OFSTED which were key 
events in the transfer of authority from the local council to a private 
contractor. These reports are publicly available on the OFSTED website. 
However, as part of the negotiation with potential interviewees, I offered to 
conceal the name of the LEA, calling it, for the purpose of the illustrative 
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example, 'Coketown'. Coketown is the fictional setting for Charles Dickens' 
novel Hard Times: 
'a town of red brick, or of brick that would have been red if the 
smoke and ashes had allowed it.... a town of machinery and tall 
chimneys.. '. (Dickens, 1854, p. 65) 
The novel begins in a primary classroom and has, as one of its 
preoccupations, a discussion of the purpose of education and conflict in 
Victorian educational theory. In the terms of the novel, it is between those 
utilitarians who believed education should concern itself with 'facts' and 
those, like Dickens, who believed that such an approach was 'annihilating 
the flowers of existence' (p. 245). As an industrial town, and also as the 
setting for an examination of the effects of extreme performance 
management on individuals within the education service, it seemed 
appropriate. 
However, this anonymity, clearly, will make it impossible for any reader to 
check independently the use made of the inspection reports in the paper. 
This limitation in the accessibility of the source material has to be seen 
against the potential benefits that the offer of anonymity brought. That offer 
of anonymity was made in order to encourage frankness and also to 
safeguard individuals if, by whatever route, elements of the paper ever 
became public. Given that key interviewees are all in mid-career, 
discretion can cause genuinely felt views to be modified or even concealed 
if they could be perceived as too critical if they became public and could 
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be attributable to individuals. I knew most of the interviewees before this 
project, through professional dealings. This made ensuring their trust in 
the process important since it was likely to form part of an ongoing 
professional relationship. 
The interviewees were: 
- the Chair of the Coketown Education Board; 
- the statutory Chief Education Officer; 
- the Contract Manager; 
-a Primary Headteacher; 
- the Diocesan Education Officer for the relevant Church of England 
Diocese; 
the Diocesan Education Officer for the relevant Catholic Diocese (who 
had taken on that role following retirement from Coketown LEA where he 
had a number of senior roles, latterly as Chief Education Officer a little 
before intervention); and 
the WES Advisor for Coketown LEA: 
The testimony was collected in broadly similar ways from each participant: 
their agreement was reached either by phone or by letter; the interview 
was recorded on a small digital recorder and then transcribed. At the 
beginning of the interview, the interviewees were given a copy of the 
research questions, framing the direction of the discussion. The form of 
the interview was conversational, with the interviewer having a set of 
prompts to steer the discussion broadly in the areas of the research 
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questions. Alongside the recording, the researcher took notes of the 
interviews in long hand. 
In practice, the interviewees were willing and co-operative. This in itself 
caused some technical difficulties since some interviews exceeded the 
memory of the recorder. In other cases, words or phrases were unclear to 
the transcriber. In those cases, the contemporaneous notes were used to 
supplement the recorded interview. However, one feature of this method is 
that subsequent interviews were recorded over earlier ones, so the source 
interviews now only exist in transcribed or note form, their voice original 
having been lost. 
The interviews took place in locations convenient to the interviewee. 
These were generally their offices except in the case of the Diocesan 
Education Officers where the interviews were in a room in a Teachers' 
Centre following a business meeting. In the case of the DfES official, the 
interview took place at a corner table of the canteen at Sanctuary 
Buildings, which in practice meant that one of the most interesting 
interviews was the hardest to transcribe. 
Efforts were made to interview a Downing Street Policy Advisor, who after 
initially agreeing, became unavailable because of other duties connected 
to the general election. To a degree, this may be seen to shorten the 
policy chain, at least as described through personal account, and therefore 
lead to the loss of one potential perspective. Of course, other interviewees 
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could have been sought - elected members for example - but issues of 
practicality, integrating study into working life made that unattainable. 
Because of these limitations, the example does not claim to be a 'Case 
Study', but rather an illustrative account of an event with policy 
significance. 
Issues of veracity and reliability 
For the purpose of the study, it has been taken for granted that, for 
example, those being interviewed offered their honest opinion and that 
policy documents mean what they say. Where a document may have had 
intentions to persuade rather than explain, the study tries to account for 
that. To that degree, the study is transparent. 
However, on another level, the issue of reliability needs to be examined. 
For example, it is clear that only one outsourced LEA was studied. In 
another case, that of Southwark, the Borough's contract with Atkins 
Education was terminated, apparently through mutual agreement, after 
two years and four months. A set of interviews from those closely involved 
in those events may have produced a different account of public/private 
collaboration than that evident in Coketown. However, the purpose of the 
illustrative example, although interesting to the researcher in its own right, 
was essentially to consider the impact of inspection and the potential for 
the development of new forms of intermediate governance in modernised 
councils. As such, the issue of the typicality, rather than the reliability, of 
the case in point is less of an issue. 
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The use of triangulation 
The technique employed to focus the range of information and data is a 
form of triangulation. As Gorard and Taylor have shown, 'triangulation' 
although widely used as a term within research, can have range of 
understandings, related to its visualisation as a metaphor. They describe 
this as 'generally the source of considerable confusion' (Gorard and 
Taylor, 2004, p. 7) and offer accounts of researchers, variously, indicating 
that triangulation requires data from three different vantage points, or three 
different kinds of data, or that only a minimum of two vantage points or 
data sets are necessary. The difficulty of the metaphor, which is taken 
from surveying, is that in its original sense it was a means of locating a 
third, unknown, point by the use of lines of sight and geometry from two 
known ones. As such, it has limited use in policy research, unless the 
policy is in some way hidden and therefore can only be identified from 
other evidence. However, Gorard and Taylor offer a useful interpretation of 
triangulation which is helpful in the use of material which is varied in nature 
for studies which are both qualitative and quantitative. They offer the idea 
of a 'complementary notion of triangulation' (Gorard and Taylor, p. 9). In 
circumstances where neither a quantitative nor a qualitative approach 
could, alone, give a complete picture but within which both can be 
valuable, they create a model in which each approach explains what it can 
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best, recognising that in some areas of the study, one approach can 
directly reinforce the other. 
It is broadly in this sense that the data has been used, revealing as it does 
the underlying consistency of policy across governments since the 1970s 
while recognising the differences of emphasis and false starts or abortive 
initiatives which the surface of policy description reveals. 
As such, the study is mainly qualitative, although quantitative methods are 
used in the discussion of the success of outsourcing LEA services. One 
methodological challenge therefore in such a study is the range and 
diversity of the information available, or potentially available, to the 
researcher. These include the kinds of factual information to be gained 
from recounting the events and legislative measures during the period of 
study, compared and contrasted to the reflective, nuanced and personal 
accounts of those whose personal histories converged with issues of 
policy at national and local level. At one level, such information is 
potentially limitless and issues of practicality become the contingent factor, 
leaving any account necessarily partial. However, the inclusion of a case 
in point gives opportunity for such accounts to be explored and argues for 
the capacity of the 'little picture' of the particular event to illumine the 'big 
picture'of national policy. The reader however needs to bear in mind 
another set of issues beyond those of methodology. They reflect the 
personal stance of the researcher, since through undertaking the study, 
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and inviting those engaged in the local process to reflect upon it, the 
researcher becomes part of the process and to a degree influences it. 
The engagement of the researcher 
In undertaking the study, one of the challenges was that of personal 
stance. The attraction of the topic came from two perspectives - first, its 
intersection with my professional responsibilities within a local authority 
and, second, from a curiosity about why a political party should promote 
policies so much at variance with its apparent core values. As such, both 
these considerations brought with them challenges to the 'neutrality' of the 
research and began to question the distinctions between description of 
policy, its evaluation and political critique. All I can say is that, in 
undertaking the first two of those tasks, I have tried to guard against the 
third. 
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Chapter Three 
From tradition to transformation 
In this chapter, I consider the development of educational policy, 
essentially in relation to schools, since the middle of the last century. In 
particular I outline the importance of the policy issues of standards, choice, 
control and freedom which have preoccupied policy makers for much of 
that period. In relation to modernisation, I consider the license in relation to 
policy which espousing the thinking characterised as'Third Way' has 
made available to New Labour. Within that analysis, I am seeking an 
understanding of the degree to which modernisation has changed the 
terms of educational policy debate or has formed a set of variations within 
it, whether it provides a new set of intentions or actions or a 
representations of earlier ones. 
In order to assess the degree to which modernisation, the suite of changes 
introduced by the New Labour government following its election in 1997, 
were innovative departures from previous policies or were adaptations of 
them, it is necessary to examine changes in relation to educational policy 
over a preceding period of years. To a degree, any initial point could be 
described as artificial, but for the purpose of this study, thel 944 Education 
Act has been taken as a starting point but with more detailed attention 
given to the issues which gained prominence following the publication of 
the so-called Black Papers, starting in 1969. It is not the intention in this 
chapter to give a detailed description of all the legislation passed by 
succeeding governments in relation to education since the middle of the 
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last century. Rather, it is intended to look at a number of key events which 
signal the emergence of policy issues and their legislative responses 
which form the context within which an assessment of New Labour policy 
can be made. This document and literature analysis was a necessary part 
of the whole study, giving the broader context to issues explored at the 
local level within the illustrative example, so that points of connection and 
dissociation could be explored as tests of the authenticity of the 
modernising project. 
'Promoting the Education of the People.... ' 
The history of the education service since the second world war has been 
one of change and renewal. To that degree, notions of 'modernisation' 
could be a general description of fifty years of change, rather than being 
exclusively used to describe activity in the last eight. The context for much 
of that time was the 1944 Education Act (the Butler Act) which set the 
framework for educational policy until it was substantially restructured by 
the 1988 Education Reform Act. The 1944 Act created a framework which 
recognised, significantly, the roles of central and local government and of 
teachers in the provision of the education service and the promotion of the 
education of the people of England and Wales (The Education Act, 1944, 
s. 1) It created: 
I an administrative system that distributed powers in such a way that 
the two main partners were able to contribute: to the Secretary of 
State was assigned the duty determine and promote national policy 
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and to Local education Authorities the opportunity to plan and 
develop their system at all levels. ' 
(Taylor and Saunders, 1976, p-3) 
Within its broad framework, curriculum development was seen as a matter 
for the teaching profession, responsibility for the school's curriculum 
resting with the governing body under paragraph 18 of the Principles of 
Government in Maintained Secondary Schools established within section 
17 of the Act. Headteachers, who were responsible to the governing body 
for the internal organisation, management and discipline of the school, 
effectively oversaw what was taught. Attempts to establish national bodies 
to regulate the curriculum were resisted by both teachers and local 
authorities (see Taylor and Saunders 1976, pp. 6-7 on the Curriculum 
Study Group and the Schools Council). Within these arrangements, 
children were to be educated in accordance with their parents'wishes 
(Education Act 1944, section 76) without that implying any detailed 
involvement by parents in either the content or manner of instruction. 
This separation of powers owed much to its wartime creation during 
conflict with totalitarian regimes. It permitted the development of 
arrangements which led to innovation in both the organisation and practice 
of education and significant differentiation between local areas and 
between schools in localities. Issues such as selection by ability at 11 or 
comprehensive provision, or the ages of transfer between phases of 
education, or classroom practice within schools were decided at different 
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locations within the system, beyond the control of the national government. 
By deliberate and democratic will, power and influence were dispersed 
within the system. 
So, for example, as this researcher discovered in his first administrative 
post, when the Royal County of Berkshire was created as an LEA in 1974 
following the 1972 Local Government Act, it contained, from the previous 
LEAs which were amalgamated within it, arrangements for the transfer of 
children between schools at 9 and 13 in Windsor, at 8 and 12 in Slough 
and at 7 and 11 in Reading and Newbury. It also contained a wholly 
selective system with single-sex grammar schools in Slough, partial 
selection in Reading and comprehensive provision in Maidenhead and 
Newbury. Within this pattern, schools decided what they taught although 
the necessity of testing for selection purposes created pressures in 
selective areas to 'teach to the tests' and prepare children for what they 
would meet as part of the LEA's selection process. 
In this way, unintentionally, many of the features necessary for a market 
approach to the provision of education services, particularly the creation of 
differentiation between systems and between institutions, could be, and 
had been, created within the framework of the Butler Act. Crucially missing 
from the framework of distributed power, however, was that of parental 
preference (beyond the weak notion of education being provided 'in 
accordance with their wishes') or consumer choice. 'Consumers' in this 
context includes not just families and children, as 'consumers' of the 
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educational process, but also industry and commerce as 'consumers' of its 
output. The underlying assumption of the Butler Act was that state 
provision, professionally designed, delivered and monitored, received by 
families almost uncritically, would provide citizens suited to the post - war 
economic and social environment. This has been described as a 
I consensus' between relatively autonomous educational institutions and 
organisations, based upon an assumed shared social democratic 
commitment to equality of opportunity (Phillips, 2001, p. 13). 
The Black Papers and their influence 
Nevertheless, this consensus was unstable. Commentators from beyond 
the 'charmed circle' of government, teachers and LEAs, were introducing 
critical commentaries on the nation's educational affairs. The self styled 
'Black Papers' (Cox and Dyson, (ed), 1969,1969,1970,1971, Cox and 
Boyson, (ed), 1977), named to contrast them to official 'White Papers' 
produced by government, and through their title, cleverly announcing their 
alternative analysis, helped to provoke and fuel public interest in the 
condition of state education. This helped to create a level of public interest 
in which the apparent breakdown in discipline in William Tyndale, a 
London primary school, could become the subject of a special publication 
by Penguin Books in 1976 (Gretton and Jackson, 1976). Issues such as 
these created a political climate in which the action or inaction of 
government became identified with educational crises and the dispersal of 
power left government unable to intervene to forestall criticism. 
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The essential thrust of the Black Papers was that standards in schools 
were unsatisfactory and indeed falling. A key and central cause of that at 
primary level was so called 'child centred teaching', flowing from the 1967 
Central Advisory Council for Education (England) Report, 'Children and 
their Primary Schools' (The Plowden Report) 
, proposing, as it was titled, 
that children had some ownership of their education and that primary 
schools were is some way 'theirs'. At secondary level, the reduction in 
selection at 11 and the spread of comprehensive education were at the 
centre of the malaise. When applied to higher education, and the 
development of more universities and institutions of higher education, was 
encapsulated in Kingsley Amis's observation, 'more has meant worse' 
(Amis, 1971, p. 172). Teaching methods which gave inadequate emphasis 
to 'the basics' of reading, writing and arithmetic, secondary schools which 
diluted academic excellence by admitting pupils who had not 
demonstrated their suitability through verbal reasoning or other tests, and 
the expansion of universities to offer higher education to a greater 
proportion of the age cohort, were all, it was said, contributing to a decline 
in standards in schools and, as part of the social changes of the 1960s, 
across society as a whole. The perceived and accepted hierarchies of 
schools and of universities, created through tradition and carefully 
managed meritocracy, were collapsing amid social and cultural 
permissiveness. 
The political danger of apparent powerlessness, and the government's 
perception that a popular view, that standards were indeed unsatisfactory, 
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was forming, left government with little option but to find a means of acting. 
'Modernisation' fits within a long tradition of attempts by government to 
manage the political implications of heightened public interest in the 
educational world. That political challenge, rather than attempts to reach 
professional consensus, has given momentum to educational reform since 
the mid 1970s. 
The issues to which Callaghan was responding were as much political as 
educational. Having become Prime Minister in April 1976, in September he 
replaced Fred Mulley, who had proved powerless to deal with the William 
Tyndale affair, with Shirley Williams as Secretary of State for Education 
and Science. On 18 October 1976, Callaghan gave what became known 
as the Ruskin College Speech and initiated what was characterised as the 
'Great Debate' about the purpose and direction of educational policy. The 
political significance of the prime minister seeking personal engagement 
with educational matters was great. It indicated a change in the concept of 
the state's stake within the provision and management of the education 
service. Callaghan, in calling for a debate, was positioning the central state 
to have that debate on its terms, having effectively placed other players as 
part of the problem rather than of its solution. In his speech he identified 
himself with those who had 'concerns', taking on the 'consumer' interest 
rather than that of the 'producer': 
am concerned on my journeys to find complaints from industry 
that new recruits from schools sometimes do not have the basic 
tools to do the job that is required. 
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There is 
.... unease felt by parents and others about the new 
informal methods of teaching, which seem to produce excellent 
results when they are in well-qualified hands but are much more 
dubious when they are not. 
To the teachers I would say that you must satisfy the parents and 
industry that what you are doing meets their requirements and the 
needs of our children. For if the public is not convinced then the 
profession will be laying up trouble for itself in the future. 
The goals of our education.... are to equip children to the best of 
their ability for a lively, constructive place in society and also to fit 
them to do a job of work. Not one or the other but both.... there is no 
virtue in producing socially well-adjusted members of society who 
are unemployed because they do not have the skills. 
In today's world higher standards are demanded than were required 
yesterday and there are simply fewer jobs for those without skill. 
Therefore we demand more from our schools than did our 
grandparents. ' 
(Callaghan, 1976) 
In a newspaper article written to commemorate the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the speech (in itself an indication of the longevity of its 
impact), Will Woodward commented: 
37 
'His argument, were it to be repeated today by Tony Blair, would 
seem in many ways unexceptional. But at the time it was 
revolutionary. ' 
(Woodward, 2001) 
Callaghan's speech introduces into the educational discussion the voices 
which would increase in volume and influence over the ensuing years. He 
characterises them as 'industry' and 'parents'. The apparent consensus, 
tested by the Black Papers' critique, was undermined further by the claim 
of one of the partners, central government, to speak for the national 
interest on behalf of those excluded from the partnership. As Callaghan 
made clear: 
'I take it that no one claims exclusive rights in this field. Public 
interest is strong and legitimate and will be satisfied. We spend E6 
billion a year on education. So there will be discussion .... parents, 
teachers, learned and professional bodies, representatives of 
higher education and both sides of industry, together with the 
Government, all have an important part to play in formulating and 
expressing the purpose of education and the standards that we 
need. ' 
(Callaghan, 1976) 
As Phillips (2001) has pointed out, Callaghan showed a degree of 
sensitivity to the position of teachers in those debates and made reference 
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to their skills. Nevertheless, the way forward was different from the status 
quo. There existed a series of issues which demanded attention: 
'Let me repeat some of the fields that need study because they 
cause concern. These are the methods and aims of informal 
instruction; the strong case for the so-called 'core curriculum' of 
basic knowledge; next what is the proper way of monitoring the use 
of resources in order to maintain a proper national standard of 
performance; then there is the role of the inspectorate in relation to 
national standards; and there is the need to improve relations 
between industry and education. ' 
(Callaghan, 1976) 
In setting the terms of debate, identifying the questions to be debated and 
resolved, Callaghan effectively took political, rather than professional, 
control of the unravelling consensus. The issues he identified have their 
roots in his contemporary political agenda (primary standards and 
methods as flowing from the Tyndale controversy, standards and 
employability spotlighted in the Black Papers). As issues they outlived his 
premiership and effectively became the agenda for the education service 
in England for the remainder of the century. 
The policy responses to those issues reflected the concerns as outlined by 
the Black Paper contributors. In an obituary on A. E. Dyson, who died in 
2002, Wendy Berliner, The Guardian's education correspondent, pointed 
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out the degree to which education policy had taken on the characteristics 
he had helped to promote, in particular: 
-a definite end to 'progressive' , child-centred learning in the primary 
school; 
- the drive to improve standards in schools dominated by tests and 
targets; and 
-a reversal of official government support for the comprehensive school. 
(cited by Chitty, 2002) 
The legacy of the Labour Party's political response to the Black Papers 
formed the terms of the debate which New Labour's 'modernisation' 
sought to resolve. 
Leisurely Reform - the early Thatcher years 
The Labour Party's engagement with these issues from a position of 
government was interrupted by its defeat in the 1979 general election and 
the election of Margaret Thatcher's Conservative administration. 
The political inheritance led to an apparent acceptance that change was 
needed. The manner in which the Conservative government took forward 
the debate about education has led to arguments that Callaghan's speech 
led more or less directly to the Thatcherite reforms of the1980s and 1990s 
(Simon, 1991). This is to a degree unfair. The contribution which 
Callaghan made was the identification of the education service as a 
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common territory for debate and dispute about the limits of government, 
which conceded legitimacy to voices beyond the professional or 
conventionally political. Into this new and larger arena, issues of industry 
and utility, alongside parental choice and markets could be readily 
introduced. As Whitty has commented: 
'Thatcherism in education, as elsewhere, was partly successful 
because whole constituencies felt excluded from the social 
democratic settlement of the post war era. Indeed, it appealed to 
them over the heads of 'bureau professionals' who were 
characterised as having got fat by controlling other people's lives in 
the name of rationality and progress. Through its policies of 
'devolution', Mrs Thatcher's government was able to characterise 
itself as democratic and the liberal educational establishment as 
elitist and engaged in restrictive practices behind closed doors. ' 
(Whitty, 2002, p-19) 
This appeal over the heads of the 'bureau professionals' had been a tactic 
employed by Callaghan. The Thatcher reforms utilised and perfected that 
technique and made it a normal part of the political arguments for reform 
or modernity in ways that can be recognised today. 
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to view the 1979 election victory as 
presenting in itself the 'turning point' in education policy between the 1944 
Act inspired consensus and the changed reality of a market driven 
education system. Just as during the Labour administration, central 
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government was moving away from its traditional partners, so during the 
early Thatcher years that movement continued at a fairly leisurely pace. 
Chitty points out 
'the arrival of a new Thatcher administration in 1979 did not bring 
about the educational reforms hoped for by right-wing pressure 
groups. For at least the first seven years of its existence, the new 
Government was prepared to operate largely within the terms of the 
educational consensus constructed by the Labour leadership in 
1976. Education was accorded comparatively little space in the 
1979 and 1983 Conservative election manifestos and on each 
occasion the programme outlined was modest and unexceptional. ' 
(Chitty, in Rattansi and Reeder (1992), p. 37) 
It is possible therefore to see the Thatcher market experiment as having 
two distinct but related phases, with the 1988 Education Reform Act as its 
defining moment and the formulating principle for all subsequent change. 
Nevertheless, the early Thatcher years contain some important 
developments which, when viewed from a perspective within the current 
phase of'modernism', have some ambiguity. Firstly, in 1979 the 
government repealed the 1976 Education Act which had sought to abolish 
selection by ability at secondary level. This was essentially a restraining 
act. It did not in itself promote new or innovative forms of organisation. It 
simply ceased to require LEAs to bring forward comprehensive 
reorganisation plans. As such, it can be seen as classically conservative. 
42 
By contrast, the Education Act 1980 held much more radical intent and 
has interesting links between the Black Paper issues and the current 
government's 'modernising'. The Act sought to extend and deepen the 
operation of what was described as parental choice but in reality, in the 
terms of the act, was parental preference. This was along two axis. Firstly, 
the Assisted Places scheme was introduced, which, subject to the means 
testing of parents and acceptance by a participating independent school, 
was intended to give access to independent secondary education to young 
people who otherwise would have been unable to afford it. This responded 
directly to the defence in the Black Papers of the direct grant and 
independent schools as upholders of academic, moral and cultural values 
which exercised a benign influence across the whole system. The writers 
had, in 1969, argued, that 'the need for the times is to extend the 
possibility of private education to more and more people by making loans 
and grants available to those who qualify for entrance but cannot afford 
the fees' ( Cox and Dyson, 1969, p. 14). 
Second, this development was introduced alongside the requirement for 
secondary admission procedures to include processes for parents to 
express preferences for schools and for those preferences to be met 
unless certain restraints made them inconsistent with the effective use of 
resources. This development was a crucial staging post in the 
development of 'choice' based approaches to the management of the 
education system. 
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It fell short, however, of the advocacy of educational vouchers contained in 
editorial introduction to Black Paper 1977, which required that, 'The 
possibilities for parental choice of secondary (and primary) schools should 
be improved via the introduction of the educational voucher or some other 
method. Schools which few wish to attend should be closed and their staff 
dispersed' (Cox and Boyson, 1977, p. 9) It left untouched therefore the 
role of LEAs in the planning of school places and the mechanisms for the 
distribution of resources thus putting those issues beyond the significant 
influence of the market. 
However, in embryo, the 1980 Act contained two of the ingredients of the 
second phase of the Conservative reforms and also of some elements of 
modernisation. Firstly, by increasing access to independent schools there 
is clear encouragement to that sector to increase its provision and thereby 
extend opportunities beyond the maintained system as it was then 
understood. The division between private and public education would 
become more porous, particularly for apparently more able children from 
poorer families. Elements of the private sector would be part of the state's 
provision and the state would therefore make a more diverse offer to the 
population. 
Secondly, parental preference would drive school admissions, rather than 
planned catchment areas or other expressions of the bureaucratic desire 
to have comprehensive admissions to comprehensive schools or to see 
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schools as essentially 'local'. It would no longer be enough for a school 
simply to see itself as providing for the children in an area. Because an act 
of 'choosing' was available to parents, schools would from that point have 
to seek to influence that choice and begin to develop different behaviours 
and different relationships between each other and with parents 
collectively and individually. This sponsorship by legislation of both choice 
and diversity has become an integral element of both market driven and 
third way reforms. 
These two developments, both expressions of a desire to make the 
system more responsive to the parental voice, demonstrate the political 
recognition of, and response to, the unease which Callaghan articulated. 
In themselves though, they do not respond to the other axis of concern, 
that of business and commerce. It is also interesting, however, when seen 
from a perspective within 'modern isation', that these two related 
developments were seen as separable within the first phase of the Labour 
education project. Just as the newly elected Thatcher government halted 
the development of comprehensive proposals, so the first education act of 
the newly elected Blair government in 1997 (1997 Education (Schools) 
Act) called a halt to new assisted places. Although existing offers to 
children would be allowed to run their course, the resources released by 
the discontinuance of the overall scheme were to be deployed to help limit 
the size of infant classes. 
45 
The response to the other key element of the Callaghan analysis, the 
significance of what had been described as the 'wide gap between the 
world of education and the world of work' (DES, 1977, cited by Chitty 
1992, p. 32) was taken up in other ways. Of most significance was the 
development of the Technical and Vocational Educational Initiative (TVEI). 
This was launched, personally by the Prime Minister in 1983 and, as has 
been pointed out by Dale (1989), appeared apparently without prior 
consultation with DES, LEAs, teacher groups or HMI. The precedence 
given to an agency such as the Manpower Services Commission, (MSC) 
led by David (later Lord) Young, who was perceived by the Prime Minister 
to be a successful entrepreneur, was a further indication of the increasing 
pluralism of the educational policy and implementation world. The MSC 
was established under the Employment and Training Act of 1973 and was 
responsible to the Department of Employment rather than to the DES. The 
involvement of agencies, created and appointed by government, as part of 
the creation and implementation of education policy, has been described 
as 'a third tier of governance' (Phillips 2001, p. 17), seen at this time at the 
point of its emergence. The focus of TVEI on piloting technical education 
for 14 to 18 year olds points to the increasing emphasis on the utility of the 
educational process, the degree to which it can be seen as preparing 
young people for'the world of work', a world apparently so distinct from 
that of education that it needed a new agency to develop it. 
In that more traditional world of education, the historic diffidence of 
government to engage directly with that which was taught continued, a 
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legacy of the eroding understanding that the relationship of a democracy 
to the instruction of its young needed to be indirect. This absence of 
central regulation of the curriculum was seen as a distinctive feature of an 
English tradition that was unlike that of other cultures and nations: indeed 
as 
'the characteristic English contribution - to concentrate attention on 
the teacher, his (sic) role as a professional who must be directly 
implicated in the business of curriculum renewal; not as a mere 
purveyor of other people's bright ideas, but as an innovator himself'. 
(Schools Council, 1968, q. McCullogh, in Phillips and Furlong (ed) 2001 
pp. 104 - 5). 
For these reasons, the period of the Conservative administration between 
1979 and 1988 can be seen in terms of continuity and development with 
the latter years of the previous Labour administration. The issues to be 
addressed had been established and many of the boundaries of the 
debate remained in place. Nevertheless, at this time the emphasis on 
loosening the apparent grip on provision of producer interests (seen as 
organised teachers, LEAs and to a degree HMI) can be discerned, along 
with the willingness to place significant resources under the control of 
bodies apparently at some distance from government, or, more properly, 
at some distance from parliamentary scrutiny, was emerging. These trends 
become more apparent in the 1988 Education Reform Act and the long 
shadow it casts. 
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The market solution - the Education Reform Act and the road to the 
Third Way 
The Education Reform Act of 1988 reveals the increased impact upon 
education policy making of a belief in the effectiveness of markets in 
achieving improvement and the desire by government to secure increased 
control over elements of an increasingly deregulated system. In that, it is 
apparently ambiguous, matching reduced controls with more regulation. 
This ambiguity, however, its means of apparently reconciling opposing 
principles, is one of its main legacies within modernisation. As Chitty has 
argued: 
'The central purpose of the 1988 Act is that power should be 
gathered to the centre and at the same time, devolved on to 
schools and parents, both processes being at the expense of the 
local education authorities. With the increased responsibilities to be 
shouldered by individual schools go the demands made by greater 
public accountability. It will no longer be possible for local 
authorities to protect schools from the effects of parental 
dissatisfaction with standards and performance, even where it can 
be shown that the disquiet is unjustified. A combination of parental 
choice, open enrolment and per capita funding ensures that 
unpopular schools will be allowed to wither away and die. ' 
(Chitty, in Rattansi and Reader, (ed) 1992, pp. 40 - 1) 
In this analysis, the virtuous effect of school vouchers, advocated within 
the Black Papers, of unpopular schools 'being closed and their staff 
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dispersed', would be achieved without vouchers but through parental 
choice. Rather than seeking to create a new or more inclusive consensus, 
replacing that of 1944 onwards which had essentially three partners, with 
one in which parents and industry were joined, the act deliberately created 
a system on inherent instability. Within the new disposition of power, 
authority and account, only one of the historic partners was secure - 
central government. All others had uncertain accounts to render to multiple 
partners - schools to individual parents as well as to the 'parental voice' 
through governing bodies, local authorities to schools for their distribution 
of resources and to electorates for their gathering of them. For schools, 
mishandling this new regime could be lethal, for reducing pupil numbers 
inevitably led to reducing revenue. 
The main architecture of the 1988 Act contains the establishment of a 
national curriculum, the creation of a national assessment system to cover 
the ten years of compulsory schooling and increasing the operational 
autonomy of schools through devolution of resources, substantially on a 
per capita basis. It is significant that, under this act, the traditional post 
1944 'home'of different policy areas has shifted. Control of what is taught, 
the curriculum, has moved from teachers and schools to the central 
government, whereas resource decisions, such as how many staff an 
individual school needed, have moved from local authorities to individual 
schools. 
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The 1988 Act took forward many of the initiatives necessary for the 
operation of a market - these are currency, choice, initiative and 
information. 
Through more open enrolment procedures, it created currency in the form 
of parental preferences for school places. These preferences were to be 
competed for by schools because if successfully secured they carried real 
currency with them upon admission. 
It created choice between types of institution by establishing new types of 
school. These were city technology colleges and grant maintained 
schools. City Technology Colleges (CTCs) were radically new in the sense 
that no pre-existent school could become one and that they had no formal 
relationship with the local authority in whose area they were established. 
They were to be created through an agreement between the Secretary of 
State and one or more persons, in order to establish and maintain an 
independent school, part of the cost to be met from public funds. Such 
schools were to admit the full ability range, cater for pupils ages 11 - 19, 
be in an urban area and follow a broad curriculum with an emphasis on 
science and technology. 
They represent a coming together of a number of policy strands, traceable 
to Callaghan and beyond. First, the policy emphasises utility: schools 
specialising in curricular areas relevant to post - industrial Britain such as 
science and technology. Second, their placement within urban areas 
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relates to the concern about the prospects for bright working class young 
people no longer able to transform their prospects by attending a grammar 
school. Third, their direct relationship with government and with private 
sponsors creates a new set of partnership arrangements, for the first time 
excluding the LEAs and teachers. Indeed, finding new ways of working 
beyond the nationally agreed terms and conditions of work for teachers 
was to be one of the CTCs' main innovations. 
Grant Maintained schools, in contrast, could be created from existing 
schools maintained by LEAs. What was needed was a parental ballot in 
favour of a change of status, the act providing for either the governing 
body of the school, or a sufficient number of parents, to trigger such a 
ballot. The outcome would be reported to the Secretary of State who 
would determine the outcome. The resulting school, in its new grant 
maintained status, would receive resources directly from government (or 
later through another element of the third tier of governance, the Funding 
Agency for Schools); its governing body would have corporate status, 
control of their admissions and be free of any direction or control by the 
LEA for the area in which they exist. 
In structural terms, then, an enhanced choice of schools could be available 
within a local area- schools maintained by an LEA, church schools with 
voluntary aided or controlled status but historically maintaining close links 
with the local authority, and new CTCs and Grant Maintained schools, 
established without relationship to LEAs or indeed in any formal sense to 
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other schools. Alongside that, assisted places were available to offer 
limited access to wholly private sector provision. The pattern was 
intentionally unstable; no single body had any overall planning authority 
(although LEAs retained responsibilities for sufficiency of places in their 
areas). Developments within the local pattern were driven at school level, 
by governors and parents, or at national level through discussions 
between politicians, officials and potential sponsors. 
Relationships between schools were to be conducted within a competitive 
framework, the competition driven, in Darwinian mode, by the survival of 
the fittest, or at least the most popular. It was anticipated that these 
mechanisms would lead to'the better management' of schools (Nick 
Stuart, formerly Deputy Secretary at the DES, q. Chitty, in Rattansi and 
Reeder, 1992, p. 41). In a contemporary commentary on the Act, written for 
headteachers, it was observed that 
'the real significance of the changes goes far beyond just financial 
matters... :a new approach is required to school management as a 
whole. ' 
(Leonard, 1988, p. 56) 
This new approach was, in part, to give clear privilege to the interests of 
the institution in the new market place and to encourage institutional 
initiative. Writing at the time, and from a standpoint which is aiming at 
impartial advice to schools about how to approach the new arrangements, 
Leonard advises. 
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'A school's long term interests are best served by striving for 
quality, in competition with its neighbours, but in a professional 
manner, but not in a cut-throat fashion. If competition degenerates 
into unrestricted poaching, numbers may grow too fast for good 
management, bringing accommodation problems which the LEA is 
unlikely to solve in the time available. Closure of a neighbouring 
school will probably mean a further influx of pupils, and may 
generate much ill feeling, in the displaced teachers and pupils 
themselves and also among the families and the teachers of the 
whole area' 
(Leonard, 1988, p. 53) 
As a contemporary commentator, Leonard is attempting to mitigate one 
potential, indeed intended, outcome of the Act by trying to enlighten the 
self interest encouraged by it within institutions. Nevertheless, he 
acknowledges that competition will occur and will need to be approached 
with the long term interests of the school (not, significantly, in this analysis, 
those of the community or indeed of pupils ) in mind. Even in this early 
engagement with the world created by the act, some of the distinctions 
and ambiguities created by the market can be perceived - the absence of 
correlation between the interests of parents as a group and those of 
individual schools and the need for modified behaviour within the new 
relationships. 
53 
The fourth element of the conditions required for the creation of a market 
is that of information to inform choice. The Act introduced a 
comprehensive suite of pupil assessments: 
'The introduction of the National Curriculum was complemented by 
provision for a standard and comprehensive assessment system. 
This national system was designed not only to measure the 
performance of pupils at the end of the four Key Stages (Years 1-2, 
3-6,7-10 and 11 -12), but also to make it possible for market forces 
to operate by providing a currency of information which would fuel 
competition between schools' 
(Broadfoot, in Phillips and Furlong, (ed), 2001, p. 142) 
As Broadfoot goes on to assert, the combination of a testing system which 
enabled apparent comparison to be made between outcomes in one 
school with another, and also national and local averages to be calculated, 
created powerful incentives for change. In such circumstances, 'it became 
virtually impossible for schools to avoid focusing their efforts on the 
immediate goal of 'getting the scores up" (Broadfoot, in Phillips and 
Furlong, (ed), 2001, p143). 
It should not be doubted that the primary intention of the Reform Act, in the 
minds of its authors and sponsors, was educational improvement. Its 
method - the creation of a market - was consistent with other aspects of 
the government's ideology which challenged apparent monopolies or 
special interest groups. It was the same ideology which sought to 
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introduce competition into the provision of such public utilities as the gas 
and electricity industries and require councils to introduce schemes to sell 
council houses to their tenants. Nevertheless, education was in some 
distinct way different as an undertaking, with habits and traditions of its 
own, not immediately susceptible to competitive pressure. 
As a contemporary commentator observed: 
'The market is formally neutral but substantively interested. 
Individuals come together in competitive exchange to acquire 
possession of scarce goods and services. Within the market place 
all are free and equal; only differentiated by their capacity to 
calculate their self interest. Yet, of course the market masks its 
social bias. It elides, but reproduces, the inequalities which 
consumers bring to the market place. Under the guise of neutrality, 
the institution of the market actively confirms and reinforces the pre- 
existing social order of wealth and privilege. The market is a crude 
mechanism of social selection. It can provide a more effective social 
engineering than anything we have previously witnessed in the post 
- war period. ' 
(Ranson, cited by Chitty, in Rattansi, A. and Reeder, D. (ed) (1992). p. 42) 
The intention of the reforms within the Reform Act was to liberate the 
education process from the self serving influence of local authorities and to 
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give incentives to individual schools to behave in a competitive fashion. 
Through this process, they would improve outcomes for all and become 
more responsive to their 'customers', the children and parents. Local 
Authorities would be the conduit of resources to some of the schools. 
Others would receive resources more directly from government. The 
instability, the dynamism within the process would create its own 
momentum. After taking the decisive step of creating this new framework, 
central government could allow market opportunities to drive improvement. 
One feature of the development of the market approach to the provision of 
schooling has been its international perspective, the degree to which 
innovations in educational policy across national boundaries had shared 
characteristics. Alongside the development of reform in England and 
Wales, related initiatives were being taken elsewhere. 
In 1994, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) published the first in a series of studies by the Centre for 
Educational Research and Innovation (CERI), under the general heading 
'What Works in Innovation'. It provided an overview of the development of 
school choice policies in a number of OECD countries, including England. 
The OECD report traces the appearance of related policy initiatives in 
different countries to both political movements and to social ones. its 
political roots are seen in the increasing influence the neo-liberal 
approach: 
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'In its crude form, this approach advocates a reliance on free 
markets rather than public planning to manage publicly financed 
services. In education this means making schools dependent for 
their resources on the decisions by 'customers' to attend 
them ...... The idea of making the market the driving discipline of 
education has been advocated in particular by American theorists, 
as far apart chronologically as Milton Friedman in 1962 and Chubb 
and Moe in 1990' 
(OECD, 1994, p. 12) 
The OECD report looks at school choice mechanisms in Australia, 
England, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden and the United States. As 
the report notes: 
'whereas no country, least of all the United States, has come close 
to implementing such ideas in their pure form, the language of the 
market has entered the education debate and influenced 
educational policy making, to varying degrees, in a wide range of 
OECD countries. ' 
(OECD, 1994, p. 12) 
It could be argued however that Chubb and Moe's work has had particular 
influence on policy making in England, and continues to do so, profoundly 
influencing modernisation under New Labour. Chubb and Moe's 1990 
book, Politics, Markets and America's Schools offers clear parallels 
between the American and the English experience. Chubb and Moe's 
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description of the one best system of American School Boards as the 
prime suspect of the causes of educational failure reflects precisely the 
efforts by the Conservative Government to create other providers and 
sponsors of local schools, in addition to or in place of LEAs. 
They offer seductively simple conclusions regarding educational 
improvement, basing their approach on their views of the conditions 
necessary to secure improvement at the level of the individual institution, 
promoting effectiveness through the organisational characteristics of clear 
goals, an ambitious academic programme, strong educational leadership 
and teacher professionalism. These characteristics are nurtured by a 
culture of school autonomy, particularly free from the external bureaucratic 
influence of local democratic institutions. They go on to advocate a system 
based upon school autonomy and parent/ student choice rather than direct 
democratic control (Chubb and Moe, 1990). 
The possibility of direct comparison between the American and the English 
system is clear. Where Chubb and Moe write of the characteristics of 
effective schools, the English example would be schools made free of 
bureaucratic control by local management, and moved to develop the 
characteristics of effective schools by competitive pressure heightened by 
external testing of pupils and publication of aggregate outcomes. Where 
they write of the importance of autonomy from external bureaucratic 
influence, English examples would be CTCs and Grant Maintained 
schools, existing outside of the local framework. Where they write of the 
natural function of democratic institutions to limit and undermine school 
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autonomy, they open the way for a reconsideration of the role and function 
of LEAs to ensure they are unable to exercise that power. The 
relationships between these autonomous institutions were to be 
characterised by competition, even though in 1992, the CERI concluded: 
'There is no evidence that this competition improves school 
performance .... there 
is strong evidence in a number of countries 
that choice can increase social segregation... ' 
(OECD, 1994, p. 7) 
To a degree however such conclusions became largely superfluous. In the 
same way that other Thatcherite policies achieved their momentum 
through popularity, so education policies which offered increased power to 
schools were always likely to be popular with headteachers. Their 
reception with LEA members and officers would always be moderated 
through the political control of the Council. 
The 1988 Reform Act created a structure for the education service 
intended to empower competition. None of its major provisions -a national 
curriculum, national and reported testing, local management of schools 
and more open enrolment encouraging individual school expansion, and 
variety in the types of school - have been repealed or substantially 
amended. It has formed all later thinking. A'third way' has been found, if at 
all, within its boundaries. 
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The Third Way and its grammar 
It is within this framework that, in opposition, the Labour Party sought to 
construct an educational programme and indeed an approach to 
government. For those for whom party political life is of little interest, and 
indeed for those for whom it is an interesting distraction, it is very difficult 
to imagine the cumulative effect of the electoral defeats, beginning in 1979 
and not ending until 1997, on those for whom party political life is a 
mission or indeed a profession. In The Third Way: The Renewal of Social 
Democracy, Anthony Giddens asserts an association of the'third way'with 
Tony Blair and New Labour. Giddens uses the phrase to refer to 'social 
democratic renewal'. This is seen as necessary in Britain following the 
lengthy period of 'neoliberal government'. Giddens notes: 
'Whatever else Thatcherism may or may not have done, it certainly 
shook up British society.... she attacked established institutions and 
elites, while her policies lent further force to changes already 
sweeping through society at large. The Labour Party and its 
intellectual sympathisers first of all responded largely by reaffirming 
old left views. The electoral setbacks the party suffered by so doing, 
however, necessarily stimulated a new orientation. ' 
(Giddens, 1998, p. ix). 
This 'new orientation' is identified as a 'third way', offering an ideological 
framework for social democracy. This is needed, at least in Britain, 
because, Giddens argues: 
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'In the UK ... theory 
lags behind practice. Bereft of the old certainties, 
governments claiming to represent the left are creating policy on the 
hoof. Theoretical flesh needs to be put on the skeleton of their 
policy-making, but to provide politics with a greater sense of 
direction and purpose. ' 
(Giddens, 1998, p. 2) 
In relation to education, the policy memory of the discomfort of its last 
government and of Callaghan's tactic to resolve it clearly remained within 
the party consciousness. Acknowledgement of the continuity between the 
issues to be addressed by an incoming Labour Government with those left 
unresolved when its predecessor lost power in 1979 is contained in a 
speech given by Tony Blair, then Leader of the Opposition, at Ruskin 
College, Oxford on 16 December 1996. The political symbolism of such an 
event was clear and intentional. In choosing such a venue for a speech 
which followed his Labour Party Conference pledge to make 'education, 
education, and education' the three priorities for an incoming Labour 
government, a reengagement with issues identified twenty years earlier 
was to be a major priority. 
In his speech, Tony Blair said: 
'A new Labour government will focus on standards, especially in the 
basics of literacy and numeracy, in all our schools. We will expect 
education - and other public services - to be held accountable for 
their performance; we will urge teachers to work in partnership with 
parents, business and the community; and we will balance parents' 
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rights with a recognition of their responsibilities ...... I believe there 
is 
the chance to forge a new consensus on educational policy. It will 
be practical not ideological. And it will put behind us the political and 
ideological debates that have dominated the last thirty years. The 
foundations of the consensus are clear. ' 
(Blair, 1996) 
By setting the timescale of the political and ideological debates which the 
new policy would supersede at 'thirty years', Blair takes into his argument 
issues which preceded Callaghan's speech and to which he in turn saw 
himself responding. Thus the key educational commitments, formulated in 
opposition by the Labour party, sought a reengagement with the issues 
which had continued to exercise the outgoing Labour Government in 1979. 
In his speech at Ruskin College in 1996, Blair makes no reference to the 
third way, although, speaking at an academic institution, references to 
theory and a framework for policy might have been expected. Indeed early 
in 1998, after the party was returned to power in 1997, an on-line debate 
was arranged by NEXUS, which described itself as'a relatively new 
addition to the world of think tanks'. NEXUS was 'delighted to run such a 
prestigious debate and to have the active participation of the Downing 
Street Policy Unit' (Halpern and Mikosz, 1998). Its purpose was to use an 
internet mailing list to 'bring together academics and other interested 
parties to discuss the nature of the Third Way'. The summary (Halpern and 
Mikosz, (ed), 1998) is introduced by a quotation from David Milliband, then 
Director of Policy at the Downing Street Policy Unit: 
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'Political economy for the twenty-first century must combine 
dynamism and equity, defining a Third Way between old Left and 
New Right. I welcome and encourage this timely NEXUS-hosted 
discussion' 
Halpern and Mikosz provide a conclusion to the debate: 
'The NEXUS discussion made clear that the term the 'Third Way' 
does not yet have a universally accepted definition. For some, this 
lack of clarity was a source of concern. Unease was expressed by 
some that the term might become used, whether intentionally or 
otherwise, to 'dump' much that was of value in older social 
democratic tradition into an implied second way that was then 
abandoned. For others, however, the use of the term offered an 
important opportunity to re-evaluate, and where necessary update, 
such tradition in the context of the challenges facing us today. 
One strand of the discussion, which we have termed the 'practical 
approach', involved examining the key-note policies that are 
becoming identified with the Third Way and inferring from those the 
objectives and principles of the Third Way. Such key-note policies 
were seen as being employment-centred social policy: the re- 
positioning of the state as a guarantor but not necessarily provider, 
of public services; a receptivity to new forms of mutualism-1 and a 
general deepening of democracy and accountability. ' 
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Julian Le Grand used this approach to conclude that the main ideas and 
values that lay behind the Third Way and the NEXUS debate were, 
I community, opportunity, responsibility and accountability. To this 
list we might add that the Third Way is itself strongly policy driven. It 
has a pragmatic, bottom-up orientation -'what's best is what works' 
(Julian Le Grand, in Halpern and Mikosz (ed), 1998) 
In a number of ways, this encapsulates the policy dilemma around the 
study of New Labour education policy, especially in attempts to see it as 
distinct from policy in the years that immediately preceded it. First, 
chronologically, the Downing Street Policy Unit is sponsoring the 
discussion after the election, that is, after manifestos have been written 
and pledge cards drafted and votes cast. Second, the debate is 
inconclusive. Although within it, reference is made to the connectivity 
between New Labour and the American Democrats - President Clinton is 
quoted as saying, 'We have moved past the sterile debate between those 
who say Government is the enemy and those who say Government is the 
answer. My fellow Americans, we have found a Third Way'- it is apparent 
that it is not yet clear on this side of the Atlantic what it might be. Third, it 
has an ambiguous relationship to action. Halpern, Mikosz and Le Grand's 
idea, that a definition of 'the way' might be deduced from the actions of 
those who claim to be following it, offers little help in using its principles to 
guide future policy. The term becomes an act of categorisation or 
justification rather than a set of principles and values. If, as Le Grand 
64 
indicates, 'what's best is what works', it is also important to know what 
matters, what the intentions of actions are, before rather than after the 
event. 
Giddens - called by Will Hutton on the cover of The Third Way, 'allegedly 
Tony Blair's favourite intellectual' - makes a number of references to 
education. 
'Education and training have become the new mantra for social 
democratic politicians. Tony Blair famously describes his three main 
priorities in government as 'education, education, education'. The 
need for improved education skills and skills training is apparent in 
most industrial societies, particularly as far as poorer groups are 
concerned. Who would gainsay that a well-educated population is 
desirable for any society? Investment in education is an imperative 
of government today, a key basis of the redistribution of 
possibilities'. 
(Giddens, 1998, p-109) 
The rhetorical question is significant. Giving priority to education is not, in 
these terms, a political choice. It is a point of consensus. It gives no clue 
as to direction or intention. The 'redistribution of possibilities' was a Black 
Paper aim, a justification for the retention of grammar schools, it was a 
neo-liberal aim leading to for example, the assisted places scheme. On the 
face of it, using Le Grand's approach, it is difficult to identify many 
initiatives which could not be classified, after the event, as 'third way'. 
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Nevertheless, the intellectual attachment between New Labour and the 
Third Way is strong and enduring. In 2003, Blair wrote an article for the 
Policy Network on 'Where the Third Way Goes from Here'. In it he argues 
for a renewal of the Third Way. It needs renewal for a number of reasons. 
He describes attacks on it by the left as a 'smokescreen for social 
democratic conservatism' and argues for its place in the Labour 
modernising tradition and the liberal tradition. He thinks it needs more 
connection with those intellectuals and academics who were sympathetic 
to the political approach but sceptical about the existence of a radical 
agenda. Third, he argues that the third way's success requires a new 
phase to reenergise it and, fourth, that the world has changed post - 
September 11, weakening governments of the left. His way forward, as 
regards public services, is: 
'On public services, we need to explore the usefulness of choice 
and contestability to extend opportunity and equalise life chances. 
Social democrats must reconcile both the claims of choice and 
equity. We must develop an acceptance of more market-orientated 
incentives with a modern, reinvigorated, ethos of public service. We 
should be far more radical about the role of the state as regulator 
rather than provider, opening up healthcare for example to a mixed 
economy under the NHS umbrella, and adopting radical 
approaches to self-health. We should also stimulate new entrants to 
the schools market, and be willing to experiment with new forms of 
co-payment in the public sector' 
(Blair, 2003) 
66 
Elsewhere in the piece, he argues that these ideas have enabled 'us', 
presumably government, 
'to espouse positions that in the past the Left had wrongly regarded 
as impossible to reconcile: patriotism and internationalism, rights 
and responsibilities, the promotion of enterprise and the attack on 
poverty and social justice. This is not to say there are no hard 
choices to be made in public policy, but that we need to move 
beyond rigid ideas and old attitudes. ' 
(Blair, 2003) 
The italics are there in the original, and they embody the key contribution 
of third way thinking to New Labour policy making - and it is essentially 
grammatical. By changing the conjunctions within sentences, by replacing 
'or' with 'and', new policy possibilities emerge, at least at the rhetorical 
level. Along with such changes, the third way method of ascribing intention 
after action, so that value follows outcome, opens up previously alien 
territory to Labour's political armoury. Indeed, elsewhere in the article Blair 
writes of 'humanitarian military intervention'. So the provision of public 
education can become'the schools market', to which 'new entrants' are to 
be 'stimulated' (Blair, 2003). 
The elevation of administrative efficiency 
A key element within the 'third way' analysis is a re-evaluation of the state 
and its purpose. As western societies change their priorities, particularly in 
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relation to issues of foreign policy and civil liberties, in response to the 
terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in New York in September 
2001, and the subsequent terrorist bombing in Madrid and, most recently, 
London, Giddens' description of the challenges of 1998 seems curiously 
one dimensional. He describes it as a time when: 
'With the passing of the bipolar era, most states have no clear cut 
enemies. States facing dangers rather than enemies have to look 
for sources of legitimacy different from those of the past. ' 
(Giddens, 1998, p. 71) 
In his analysis, this leads Giddens to assert that: 
'To retain or regain legitimacy, states without enemies have to 
elevate their administrative efficiency. Government at all levels is 
mistrusted partly because it is cumbersome and ineffective ... After 
all, the term 'bureaucracy', with its attendant connotations of red 
tape, was invented to refer to government.... Social democrats must 
respond to the criticism that, lacking market discipline, state 
institutions become lazy and the services they deliver 
shoddy..... Reinventing government certainly means adopting 
market-based solutions. But it also should mean reasserting the 
effectiveness of government in the face of markets. ' 
(Giddens, 1998, pp. 74 - 5) 
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This notion of 'efficiency' has been at the heart of local government reform, 
its modernisation, during the Blair government. Indeed as part of that 
search for efficiency, issues of governance and accountability have had 
reducing significance at the level of the local authority. Instead, 
performance and delivered value, measured and assessed through a 
number of processes, have become the goal of the intermediate tier of 
governance and administration. 
This has led, in a path stretching back to the MSC and the start of the 
'third tier of governance', to the creation of a range of agencies and 
appointed bodies which have taken on roles and responsibilities formerly 
undertaken by elected local government. These agencies, typically, report 
to central government departments and hence to ministers, although some 
have appointed local, intermediary bodies themselves. These agencies 
have included some which have found their usefulness overtaken by other 
events. The Funding Agency for Schools, established in 1994 and 
ambitiously titled, since it was responsible solely for the funding of grant 
maintained schools, was disbanded when the sector was reorganised 
following the School Standards and Framework Act (1998) and its 
functions returned to the LEAs. The Further Education Funding Council, 
established in 1992 to fund and regulate the F. E. sector after it was 
removed from the local authorities as part of the financial arrangements 
which became necessary to fund local government after the abandonment 
of the poll tax, was disbanded following the Learning and Skills Act 2000 
and its functions this time vested with another agency, the Learning and 
Skills Council. This body has a regional structure, involving local 'councils', 
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none of them elected. Currently, personal advice, guidance and careers 
advice to young people between the ages of 14 and 19 is provided by 
Connexions Services on a sub-regional basis. Careers services were 
previously provided by local authorities. They are now provided, largely, by 
private sector organisations working on a contract basis to Connexions 
Partnerships. These partnerships themselves may relate to local 
government through the involvement of local government officers in their 
boards, but not through locally elected councillors or council structures. 
Government is in the process of reviewing the arrangements made for 
young people as part of a Green Paper on Youth Matters (Cm 6629 July 
2005) and it is widely expected to require changes to the Connexions 
concept itself. 
The history of these organisations is interesting from two standpoints. 
First, their relatively short lifespan and the absence of controversy over 
their closure, can be seen as an indication of their shallow roots in local 
communities. Second, they appear to support Giddens' point about the 
need for flexibility in the delivery of services. As these organisations 
become dysfunctional they can be readily disbanded. Arrangements for 
dealing with perceived under-performance in democratically based 
organisations are much more difficult for central government to deal with, 
as the illustrative example of outsourcing will demonstrate. 
Alongside the creation of more diverse and more centrally focused means 
of account through these agencies, central government is increasingly 
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explicit about its expectations of local government. Its core purposes are 
identified as: 
'Being effective community leaders, developing sustainable 
communities. 
Procuring or delivering customer-focused, continuously improving 
and efficient services'. 
(ODPM, 2005, pp. 5- 6) 
This is described, politically, by the current Local Government Minister as 
'Local government must provide community leadership and 
improved services within carefully controlled budgets. Customers 
demand greater choice in services and provisions for all. 
Transforming the way local government works is critical to that 
success'. 
(ODPM, 2005, reverse of front cover) 
Through this process, a different relationship with the market will be forged 
- one which sees market flexibilities harnessed to public value, in the third 
way grammar an 'and' not an 'or'. 
This pressure to achieve effectiveness has been carried forward 
consistently by Labour. Under the Local Government Act 1999, all councils 
were required to conduct their affairs in such a way as to secure best 
value, pursuing their roles in the most economic, efficient and effective 
manner. This has been supplemented subsequently by large scale 
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inspections of the work of councils under the comprehensive performance 
assessment process and their public classification as between 'weak' and 
I excellent', a process which is now under review but which will be 
repeated, with revised criteria. 
These policy intentions were set within a developing performance 
framework for councils instituted by the previous government. If councils 
had not been asked to 'modernise' by the Conservative administration, 
they had certainly been asked to change and to engage differently with the 
private sector through the compulsory competitive tendering of specified 
council services. There had also been introduced, under Section 38 of the 
Education Act 1997, (the last education act of the soon to be defeated 
Conservative administration) provision for the inspection of the 
effectiveness of local education authorities' work to support school 
improvement. These inspections were to be undertaken by OFSTED and 
the reports made public. 
OFSTED had been itself established under the 1992 Education (Schools) 
Act, a process through which, Husbands observed, 'The privatisation of 
school inspection transferred to private inspection teams formal 
responsibility for the regulation of quality' (Husbands, in Bridges and 
Husbands (ed). 1996, p. 12). That body now had responsibility for the 
regulation of quality in organisations which were not agencies but 
democratically elected (since, formally, the local education authority is the 
council, not its education committee nor indeed its chief education officer). 
This added a further dimension to an already complex set of 
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accountabilities since an agency would report to the Secretary of State on 
the effectiveness of a local authority and the Secretary of State would 
have powers to intervene, a power created through the School Standards 
and Framework Act 1998. Government would not find itself facing, at the 
level of a local authority, the remembered powerless embarrassment of 
the William Tyndale affair. 
In the next chapter, I consider the framework of inspection which was 
created to assess performance and the mechanisms of intervention which 
were created to empower central government to direct changes to the 
operation and governance of a Local Education Authority. 
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Chapter Four 
'Coketown'- a case in point 
In this chapter, I relate the modernising project to the inspection and 
subsequent intervention in a metropolitan LEA, 'Coketown', treated as a 
case in point, an illustrative example which permits consideration of issues 
broader than itself. This involves a consideration of the developing 
inspection framework for LEAs and the place of self regulation within that. I 
also look at the 'evidence' of inspection, its findings, as indicative of issues 
of governance and effectiveness for LEAs in the set of relationships 
flowing from the Education Reform Act 1988 and at the particular 
structures within which intervention is conducted. The chapter is 
introduced by a consideration of the value and limitations of such a case in 
point as means of illuminating the question of whether modernisation has 
the capacity to transform the public provision of an education service. 
Introduction to illustrative example 
The illustrative example is a study of the OFSTED inspection of a 
metropolitan LEA, called in this account 'Coketown', and its aftermath in 
terms of intervention by the Secretary of State to remedy what were seen 
as the LEA's failings. It is seen as illustrative of a number of the elements 
and issues which surround a study of the modernising and 
transformational project which New Labour claims to have for public 
services and in this case education in particular. These elements include 
the role of external inspection in service assessment and the power and 
value assertions which are contained in the relationships of the inspectors 
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and the inspected. It will also include the role of 'audience', those not 
within the process itself but witnessing and on occasion influencing its 
process without having responsibility for it or having a clear account to 
render for their actions. It will be argued that there is a degree of 
uniqueness in the individual account, which leads to me describing it as an 
'illustrative example', intended to offer insights rather than claim a whole 
explanation which might be expected from a 'case study'. It is this degree 
of particularity which makes generalisation about the policy itself or its 
implementation upon this evidence tentative. 
Although the information for the study was not collected from politicians or 
agents at the highest levels of government, the issues which Ball alludes 
to in his work on researching inside the state still apply. On a range of 
interviews he undertook with national politicians and others, he comments: 
'This is data as indicative of structural and relational constraints and 
influences which play in and upon policy making. -This is the 
'because' of policy..... accord i ng ly, no one interpretational mode or 
set of theoretical tools or interpretational stance is adequate or 
exhaustive of the analytical possibilities of policy analysis..... By 
engaging with 'direct evidence' in this way we are also confronted 
directly with complexity, unable to gloss over contradictions, and 
must face up to incoherence. ' 
Ball, in Halpin and Troyna, (ed), 1994, p. 109). 
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These are the kind of issues faced by someone seeking insights into a 
particular set of circumstances and seeking to relate them to wider 
concerns or to derive more general truths from them. 
At a level of broad abstraction the task appears easy. Such a high level 
study would say something like: 
'Coketown LEA was inspected by OFSTED and found to be 
unsatisfactory. The Secretary of State used her powers of 
intervention and a contract to deliver a range of educational services 
on behalf of the council was let to a private contractor. This indicates 
that the power was available to central government and that it was 
deployed. ' 
This account would have the appearance of factual neutrality, and could 
make a quantitative contribution to an understanding to the policy issues 
around performance improvement within the context of inspection: clearly 
at least one LEA had been subject to intervention. However, beyond 
whatever interest that generated, little of worth would have been shared. 
At a level beyond that, the illustration could look at more detail in the 
findings of the inspection and the consequences in terms of the delivery of 
services. For example, were all services outsourced or just some? What 
arrangements did the contractor make to take on the new responsibilities? 
Such an account, in seeking to be a record rather than an interpretation of 
the events, also cannot transcend the particular. 
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It is only by going beyond the neutral account that insight can be obtained 
and by going beyond the neutral voice, by engaging in a qualitative 
analysis of the events, or at least some of them (since not all will be 
available for discussion), that potentially generic information on the 
'because' of the policy can be brought out. But that in itself is partial. 
Halpin warns: 
'qualitative approaches to the investigation of education policy need 
to avoid the risk of only telling us a great deal about the assumptive 
worlds of policy makers and the contexts in which their policies are 
implemented and very little about the effects that certain policies 
have in terms of improving or making things worse'. 
(Halpin, in Halpin and Troyna, (ed), 1994, pp. 198 - 9). 
Along with work to look at the 'because' of policy, there also need to be 
efforts to look at the 'so whats', to seek a view on impact and outcome. 
One difficulty here relates to issues of theory. The study of education 
policy is not a discreet discipline, with its own rules and conventions, its 
own method of enquiry. It is a territory in which a number of sociologists 
seem to have camped. Halpin and Troyna 'took it mostly for granted' that 
'the study of education policy is simply a branch of the sociology of 
education" (1994 p. 200). However, students with other disciplines have 
legitimate interests. These can include historians, political scientists, 
psychologists and others or indeed those without clear disciplines, such as 
educational administrators, who become engaged in the process, 
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implementation and outcome of policy and are curious to know more 
about, and understand better, its dynamic. 
For the purposes of this illustrative study therefore, I am seeking to get 
beyond the neutral, factual account and approach the activity which Whitty 
calls 
, understanding the intersection between biography and history, 
between identity and structure and between personal troubles and 
public issues - what C. Wright Mills (1196 1) termed the exercise of 
the 'sociological imagination" 
(Whitty, 2002 p. 15) 
The form of the account will therefore offer a description of process and 
outcome, drawn from the published reports and other available data, on 
the engagement by the inspectorate with Coketown LEA. This will be 
largely'the facts of the case'. Set alongside this will be the evidence drawn 
from a set of illuminative interviews, with a number of those involved in the 
process. By setting these kinds of information alongside each other, 
material for policy analysis will be produced. At one level, this can be the 
personal account, the 'what was it like for you? ' question, but beyond that 
it can generate a 'policy story', in which the generality of policy becomes 
shaped and formed by real world issues. The theoretical position therefore 
reflects that of Bowe, Ball and Gold, as described by Scott (Scott, 2000, 
p. 41) that policy is changed at different sites in the policy relay and 
therefore does not emerge in the form intended by policy makers. The 
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I policy story' itself will form the basis for some tentative conclusions about 
the nature of modernising at the level of an LEA. 
The facts of the case: the inspections of Colketown and their methods 
Coketown was first inspected by OFSTED in 1999. It formed part a 
programme of inspections, coordinated by OFSTED but delivered in 
conjunction with the Audit Commission, following the Education Act 1997 
section 38 which had given OFSTED the power to inspect and report on 
LEAs. The Act had been one of the last passed by the outgoing 
government. The new government had not repealed it. 
Ofsted managed the process of inspecting LEAs by establishing an annual 
programme of inspections for batches of authorities, drawing together 
teams led by HMI but also involving representatives of the Audit 
Commission and others. Teams were not fixed; rather they were drawn 
together for particular inspections and then disbanded. Contracts were not 
offered to private contractors to undertake this work as was the case for 
school inspection. The agencies of government - Ofsted and the Audit 
Commission - were to undertake this directly. 
The framework for inspection (Ofsted, 1999) directed inspectors to focus 
on the effectiveness of LEA work to support school improvement. In 
practice, this was seen as a very broad remit, since arguably any aspect of 
an LEA's work could have some impact, however indirect, on school 
improvement. The reports, when published, described themselves, on their 
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cover, as'INSPECTION OF XXXX LOCAL EDUCATION AUTHORITY' 
without any indication of possible limited remit. This focus was mentioned 
in the Introduction, which dealt largely with methodology. The reports were 
from the'OFFICE OF HER MAJESTY'S CHIEF INSPECTOR OF 
SCHOOLS in conjunction with the AUDIT COMMISSION', (capitals in 
original), also bearing the Ofsted logo. Published, starkly, in black and 
white, the reports had all the trappings of authority. 
In common with others, the Introduction to the report on Coketown 
describes the method of inspection. It is: 
'partly based on data, some of which was provided by the LEA, on 
school inspection information and audit reports, on documentation 
and on discussion with Council members and officers and 
representatives of the LEA's partners. In addition, a questionnaire 
seeking views of aspects of the LEA's work was circulated to (a 
large majority) of the schools. In Coketown's case the 'response 
rate was 83%'. 
The method also involved visits to a limited number of schools (in this case 
just short of 18%) to: 
'test the views of governors, headteachers and other staff on the 
key aspects of the LEA strategy. The visits also considered whether 
the support which is provided by the LEA contributes, where 
appropriate, to the discharge of the LEA's statutory duties, is 
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effective in contributing to improvements in the school, and provides 
value for money. ' 
The method clearly has some of the elements of classic academic enquiry, 
using data to generate hypotheses and triangulation to test them out. The 
sources of information here are 'data', 'some' of which was provided by the 
LEA, 'discussion' with members and officers, a 'questionnaire' and 'visits 
to test views'. However, it is not explained in the document how the 
information obtained from these sources is verified or synthesised, 
whether the method of enquiry looks for consistency (and accepts that as 
true) or inconsistency (and then has a process for reconciling difference). 
It is even opaque on the nature of the data - what information, other than 
that provided by the LEA, was taken into account? How were the 
'discussions' recorded and evaluated? How were 'views' tested - through 
relatively open discussion, or through focused discussion which sought 
views on preformed hypotheses? How are issues such as'value for 
money' defined - against what standard and whose standard? These 
issues are not addressed in the document. Rather, a description of an 
apparently valid method is offered to indicate impartiality and open 
enquiry, to reassure that the conclusions are trustworthy. However, unlike 
academic enquiry, the whole evidence base is not available to an 
independent reviewer, nor to those inspected. In such circumstances, a 
report which claims objectivity, a quantitative status, is qualitative and 
unverifiable. 
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Coketown was inspected again in 2002, following the partial outsourcing of 
its education functions to a private contractor. The legal framework under 
the 1997 Act remained in force, although the 'Framework for the 
Inspection of Local Education Authorities (December 2001)' had been 
revised and was in the public domain. The focus remained on 
effectiveness in relation to supporting school improvement but there were 
additional reference to the Local Government Act 1999, with its best value 
requirements. Perhaps as a consequence, the Audit Commission logo had 
equal prominence with Ofsted's on the cover of the report. The other 
significant presentational difference is the identification by name of the 
Lead Inspector, an HMI. Authority was assuming a human face. 
The method again involved 'a range of material', similar to the previous 
range but given in more detail to include 'focus groups of headteachers 
and governors, staff in other departments of the local authority and 
diocesan representatives'. In addition the team had the previous report 
available to them. On this occasion, in Coketown, the questionnaire went 
to all schools, with a response rate of 65%. Visits were undertaken to 4.6% 
of the schools to test the views of governors, headteachers and other staff. 
The commentary on the inspection method made earlier is still 
substantially valid, although a published framework and more 
transparency about whose views were sought gives more information and 
reassurance about the reliability of the conclusions. 
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There is however a significant new element within the process. A'self 
evaluation', produced by the LEA, was required by the new framework. it 
is relevant at this point to refer to the work of Foucault. In his study on 
Foucault and Marxism, Smart comments on issues of discipline and social 
regulation, 'The development of discipline signified the emergence of a 
new form of power... ' which would be 'spectacular, ritualistic, visible and 
manifestly violent; (Smart, 1983, p. 109). Within the context of local 
government, public reporting of inspection reports and their treatment in 
the local press, and the outsourcing or dismissal of staff as a consequence 
might be described in those terms. Smart goes on to describe Foucault's 
analysis that: 
'the new tactics of power defined by discipline were qualitatively 
different..... the exercise of power was to be obtained at the lowest 
possible cost .... 
in political terms it meant that power was to be 
exercised discreetly in order to reduce the likelihood that resistance 
would be aroused' 
(Smart, 1983, p. 109). 
This would lead to 'the formation of a disciplinary society' (p. 110) since, 
'discipline is a power which infiltrates the very body and psyche of the 
individual, which, in this instance, transforms the life and time of the 
individual into labour-power' (p. 1 13). 
The discreet requirement under the new framework for self evaluation 
was part of a developing scheme of surveillance, through which the 
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inspected are engaged in the process of their own inspection and take on 
the perspectives of inspectors on their own performance, thereby, in 
Foucault's term 'individualising techniques of power' (cited in Smart, 1983, 
p. 122). If inspection does not in itself lead to improvement, it is a powerful 
tool of compliance. 
Coketown was inspected by Ofsted for the third time in the autumn of 
2004. Given the LEA's difficulties, it is difficult not to believe that the 
intention of government was that its inspection agency be one of its means 
of effecting change rather than a neutral reporting mechanism. By 
inspecting repeatedly, the pressure to change and conform is maintained. 
The framework for inspection, still within the context of the Education Act 
1997, had changed a third time (Ofsted, 2004), although one of the three 
'overall judgements' which are made within the new framework relates to 
progress since the last inspection. Given the framework and judgement 
changes, strictly, like is not being compared with like. 
This is further evidenced by the overall structure of the process and the 
report. The revised inspection framework groups its judgements into five 
areas: Corporate leadership of education; Strategy for education and its 
implementation, Support to improve education in schools, Support for 
special educational needs; and Support for social inclusion. There is 
evidence here of a broader range of inspection. It is no longer focused 
upon the LEA and school improvement. Rather, it seeks to examine other 
areas of LEA responsibility around the education of the more vulnerable. 
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This developing interest in these areas from an inspection point of view 
can be seen alongside other developments of government policy in 
relation to exclusions and behaviour and special needs and statements. 
The relationship between inspection and the implementation of policy, 
rather than the pursuit of a judgment on a notion of 'quality', is becoming 
more sophisticated. A public service version of 'compliance testing' is in 
development. 
There are two further significant developments within the third framework 
which are of importance here. 
First, the balance between self evaluation and external inspection has 
shifted. The third inspection framework requires the production of a self 
evaluation by the LEA which precisely matches the inspection template 
used by the inspectorate, including supporting evidence. This template, 
referred to as Judgement Recording Statements, forms the basis for 
inspection activity and for the subsequent report. The initial part of the 
inspecting process is a review, by the inspecting team, of the self 
evaluation. This offers the inspectorate the opportunity to accept, or 'sign 
off', elements of the self evaluation before the team arrive in the authority 
for what is described as 'fieldwork'. 
In this way, a number of complex incentives are introduced into the 
inspection process from the perspective of the inspected. Given the 
burden that inspection is found to be (since the normal business of the 
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organisation needs to be maintained during the process), having elements 
of evaluation 'signed off' is likely to be welcome. It produces an incentive 
within the self evaluation to reach a self judgement which is likely to be 
acceptable to the enquirers, further, in Foucault's term, 'individualising' the 
'techniques of power' (Smart 1983). Indeed, the form of the final report 
indicates which areas of enquiry were subject to fieldwork and which were 
not. Mention is sometimes made in the Summary of the Main Findings 
about the degree of consistency between the self evaluation and the 
judgements made by the external inspectors. Praise is implied if there is a 
close correlation - if the organisation has perceived itself as inspectors 
would see it. The hegemony of values, implicit in the primacy of inspection 
as a means of control, is underlined as organisations become 'disciplined' 
to accept and mimic them. 
The second significant change is the prevalence of the numerical 'scoring' 
of performance within the inspection report. The self evaluation requires 
the LEA to give itself a score, on a seven point scale, against each of the 
areas upon which inspection judgements are to be made. 
In the report itself, there is provided a 'Summary Table of Judgements' at 
the beginning of each Section. These are in horizontal bar graph form, the 
vertical axis showing the area of judgement (for example, 'The 
effectiveness of educational planning for children and young people') and 
along the horizontal axis the numbers 1 -7,7 being at the right hand side. 
The information presented has not just the bar itself, shaded, but also a 
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small triangle, a vertical line and a diamond. Below the summary table, 
there is an explanation: 
'The bar represents the grade awarded to the LEA, the triangle 
represents the LEA's self-evaluation grade, the vertical line 
represents the LEA's previous grade and the diamond represents 
the average grade of all LEAs inspected in the last year. 1= Very 
Good 
,2= 
Good, 3= Highly Satisfactory, 4= Satisfactory, 5 
Unsatisfactory, 6= Poor, 7= Very Poor. ' 
The Appendix A of a Report gives a summary of all grades, including what 
are described as 'Overall judgements'on the 'Progress made by the LEA 
overall', the 'Overall effectiveness of the LEA' and 'The LEA's capacity for 
further improvement and to address the recommendations of the 
inspection'. Each of these is given its own numerical judgement, although 
the self evaluation grade is not shown. Appendix B explains, 'The 
numerical grades awarded for the judgements made in this inspection are 
to be found in Appendix A. These numerical grades must be considered in 
the light of the full report. Some of the grades are used in the 
Comprehensive Performance Assessment profile for the education 
service'. 
In presentational terms, giving precedence to the table of numerical 
judgements provides an incentive to busy readers not to proceed to the 
text. The injunction to consider these numerical judgments in the light of 
the text is given in an Appendix, where a busy reader is less likely to visit. 
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There is a developing tendency to rank LEAs by reference to the single 
'Overall effectiveness' judgement which informs the text of the initial 
sentence of the Summary, in this case, 'Coketown local education 
authority (LEA) is now highly satisfactory. The busy reader therefore need 
not venture beyond the first sentence of the summary to know, literally, 
'the score'. The reason for this development is given in the reference to 
CPA in Appendix B. The purpose of inspection, increasingly, is to provide 
numerical information for other aspects of assessment in a developing 
hierarchy, each with a powerful reductionist methodology. Thus a seven 
point scale for LEAs becomes a five point scale for Councils overall and 
hence to a number of asterisks, or 'stars), similar to those 'awarded' to 
hotels or restaurants in commercially produced guides. The use of term 
6 awarded' in Appendix B may be coincidental but may also reveal a similar 
'consumer focus' in a process which is itself part of the 'market' Blair 
described in his Third Way article described earlier. 
Much of the government's approach to the management of the education 
system, beginning with schools in the publication of so called 'league 
tables', the praising of individual schools in HMCI's Annual Reports and 
now proceeding in relation to LEAs and hence to Councils, is about the 
identification and classification of elites. The Black Paper charge of 
lowering standards, of 'more' becoming 'worse', has been answered 
through an elaborate categorisation of assessed 'quality', publicly reported 
and simplified in order to provide apparently objective information and 
thereby shape perception. 
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What is the problem to which this is the answer? Issues of 
performance and governance 
The 1999 report on Coketown makes a number of judgements on the 
performance of the LEA. For ease of reference they are contained in a 
'Commentary' near the beginning of the report. Although acknowledging 
that some schools perform very well and most are improving, the report 
concludes that: 
'The LEA has been able to contribute little to improvement in school 
performance in recent years. For much of the 1990s, political 
instability, evidenced in successive administrations and culminating 
at one stage in the virtual paralysis of the decision-making process, 
has handicapped practical action on education. ' 
The report shows some signs of optimism: 'the climate is now a good deal 
more constructive, and there is a commitment to doing better by (the) 
schools' and 'adequate administrative systems are now in place in most 
areas'. However, progress is 'too slow' and, 'The LEA remains well off the 
pace of developments required by government and evident elsewhere. 
A list of more detailed judgements is given on those aspects of 
performance which are performed inadequately and a (shorter) list of 
those which are good features. 
The key judgements are that the LEA, 'is not adequately discharging two 
general responsibilities: - to exercise its functions with a view to raising 
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standards in schools, and to use resources efficiently'. In the core 
business of both the inspection agents, Ofsted for issues of standards and 
the Audit Commission in relation to resources, the performance was 
unsatisfactory. That leads on the central observation in this report: 'There 
are three features of the LEA which cast doubt on its capacity to make the 
improvements needed at a sufficient pace'. The three features, in 
summary, are: historic slowness to respond to national changes: a 
management structure which confuses strategic direction with operational 
control; and, third, a poor relationship with schools inconsistent with the 
expectations of the government's Code of Practice on LEA-School 
Relations. (This document (DfES 1999, revised 2001) had been produced 
by WES to regulate relationships between LEAs and schools following the 
abolition of GM status). 
In terms of the future prospects for the authority, it is the 'capacity to make 
the improvements needed' judgement which is decisive. Yet of all the 
judgements made within the document, that is probably the least defined. 
Essentially, it rests upon a belief that the past is likely to replicate itself into 
the future; that because historically the LEA and its schools behaved in 
particular ways, without intervention they will continue to do so. The 
evidence in the report, of improving schools, of adequate administration, of 
new commitment to do better is outweighed by the historic failure to 
achieve the pace 'required by government). 
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It is worth noting that the issues within Coketown are not ones, solely, of 
officer management or competence. The report is critical of governance, of 
the priorities of democratically elected members when set alongside the 
priorities of government. This is not to argue a case in support of the 
behaviour of Coketown members. The point is to look at the relationship 
between local and national government and the degree to which, within 
that, the national schemes of inspection serve to enforce political ends and 
ensure the translation of national priorities into local action. 
The recommendations within the report do not in themselves specify 
outsourcing aspects of the service. In terms of officer management, they 
call for simplification of the structure; in terms of member oversight they 
look to a more efficient focus by the Education Committee or whatever 
replaces it; in terms of school relations, they seek better communication. 
The 1999 report led to significant changes in the management of the 
education service. In May 2000, the creation of a private sector strategic 
partnership for school improvement and associated strategic management 
functions was agreed between government ministers and senior elected 
local government members. The services of a contractor were obtained 
from July 2001 under a direction from the Secretary of State for Education 
and Skills. This led to a 'mixed economy' of services, some being provided 
by a contractor on behalf of the council, others provided directly by the 
council itself, all under the leadership of the chief education officer. 
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This can be seen as an attempt to deal with issues of both performance 
and governance. The involvement of ministers with senior members 
acknowledges the disposition of responsibilities between local and central 
government. The identification of a private contractor brings, in theory, 
more available capacity to bear upon the areas for improvement. The 
central role of the CEO ensures coherence and also compliance with the 
Education Act 1996, which requires LEAs to appoint a 'fit person'to be 
responsible to elected members for the strategic management of the 
education service within the LEA. 
The inspection of Coketown LEA in 2002 was outside the normal timetable 
because of the degree of concern and the intervention of the Secretary of 
State. As before, its main points are contained in a Commentary near the 
beginning of the document. The report notes the restructuring which has 
occurred and is complimentary regarding the progress of the contractor in 
relation to school improvement and associated strategic management. It is 
critical however of the engagement of elected members in offering 
strategic direction and in monitoring performance. 'In short, ' the 
commentary concludes, 'the LEA is still not exercising all its relevant 
functions effectively in order to raise standards in schools'. The crucial 
judgement on 'capacity' is that 'the LEA's overall capacity and capability 
for further improvement are poor'. There follows a list of reasons relating to 
leadership of elected members, record of improvement to date, newness 
of senior management team and lack of an embedded system for budget 
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management and evaluation. Future progress would be dependent on 'the 
extensive package of support now in place 
The report indicates therefore persistent issues regarding governance and 
performance which the limited intervention had not in itself addressed. The 
response by government was to increase the scope of the direction and 
remove further functions from the direct control of the authority. The 
response of the Council was to change its CEO, and of the contractor to 
replace its senior manager responsible within Coketown for the contract. In 
terms of performance and governance it required the creation of new 
structures to manage the new arrangements. 
Intervention in practice: structures of operation, management and 
accountability 
New structures were established to manage the new division of 
responsibilities between a private sector contractor and an LEA with 
statutory responsibilities which over time had been judged unable to 
discharge them adequately. During the period of intervention, political 
control of the council had changed, with consequent changes to political 
management alongside changes to officer personnel. The Council had 
been further criticised following a comprehensive performance 
assessment and the formal involvement of the Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister followed. Thus, two government departments were involved in 
improvement initiatives within the council simultaneously, looking 
respectively at corporate and education service improvement. 
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The ODPM commissioned a national firm of management consultants to 
make recommendations and proposals were made for the establishment 
of a Coketown Education Board with an independent chair, appointed after 
national advertisement. The appointment was made by the senior elected 
members of the council in consultation with the WES, the ODPM and a 
representative of the contractor. The period of appointment of the chair 
matched the length of the new contract. The Board composition sought to 
draw together relevant local partners including the Chief Executive of the 
local Learning and Skills Council, Headteacher representation from 
neighbouring boroughs, a position for the CEO from another authority, a 
representative of the WES, the Principal of a local FE college, a 
representative from the local university, a representative of the church 
authorities, representatives of the teacher trade unions and elected 
members including the portfolio holder for education and representatives 
from other parties. 
The purposes of the board were to be the main source of advice to the 
Council on the strategic direction of education services in Coketown. This 
included advising the Council on its vision for education and helping it to 
engage key stakeholders in developing and delivering strategies for 
improvement; the preparation, implementation and evaluation of the post- 
OFSTED action plan; the development of strategic education policy; and 
the effective targeting of resources to provide schools with efficient and 
effective services. The Board was to have no statutory authority although 
its recommendations were to provide the main basis for decision making 
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on any educational matters by the Council. it would have the right to refer 
an issue to the Secretary of State for Education and Skills in the event of 
the Council not following its recommendations. 
At a time when the pressure upon local government was to move away 
from committee structures, and 'modernise' around the principal of 
individual member responsibilities and therefore clearer accountability, it 
may seem that what was created to manage the service after intervention 
was something which resembled a pre-modernisation education 
committee. In this case however, its duties were to recommend to the 
Council, with the reserve power to refer matters to government if its 
recommendations were not accepted. In terms of accountability, the 
arrangements appeared to leave the Council with its responsibilities but 
dependent in its capacity to fulfil them on an ad hoc body. 
This high level overview of the relationship is underpinned by other 
processes. There are meetings on a weekly basis between the CEO and 
the contractor to check progress in terms of the objectives that have been 
set. That is supplemented by telephone conversations at least once a day 
with the managing director. On a formal basis, once a month a report to 
the Cabinet member is prepared by the Contractor. This has been 
discussed with and agreed by the statutory CEO the week before its 
submission. That report is the formal monitoring mechanism for the 
performance of the contractor. 
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This is seen by the statutory CEO as providing a framework to 
performance manage the contractor. The relationship which is being 
created is described by the statutory officer as aiming to be more that of 
the 'critical friend' than that of the 'contractor monitory. 
Alongside this set of internal relationships between the contractor, the 
specially created Coketown Education Board, the statutory officer and the 
responsible elected member, there is a parallel accountability within the 
management arrangements of the contractor. The Coketown contract is 
held by an international service company with a wide spread of 
undertakings beyond the education service. The manager of the Coketown 
contract reports directly to a Board Member of the parent company 
responsible for the learning related undertakings of the company. These 
learning related activities are themselves part of a larger grouping 
described as 'government services'. There are twice yearly conferences 
for contract managers and the contract manager describes weekly 
conversations with the board member who in turn attends a contract board 
meeting roughly every six months. Financial monitoring forms part of this 
process but is not described by the contract manager as central to the 
visit. 
The contract arrangements provide for core costs and a bonus element 
based upon performance. The profit element of the core contract is not 
described as being dependent on performance bonuses. In practice, within 
the operation of the contract, a performance penalty levied upon the 
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contractor in one year of the contract was reinvested by the Council in ICT 
equipment in schools. Similarly, a small performance bonus in another 
year was reinvested in local services rather than returned to the parent 
company. Within the scale of the contract, the precise costs of which are 
commercially sensitive, the penalty and bonus elements appear to be 
relatively small. On this basis, once the terms of the contract are agreed, 
financial matters do not appear to be central to its operation. The parent 
company is described as having a strategy of seeking modest returns from 
a wide and diversified range of undertakings rather than seeking maximum 
profitability from a few. 
This strategic view, arguably influential in terms of the impact of the 
contract, is of necessity beyond the governance reach of the Coketown 
Education Board and of the Council. It rests within the governance of the 
service provider and operationally within the contracting approach taken 
by the service provider. 
However, issues of operational strategy and governance exist within a 
context of day to day interactions of those working within the LEA. I go on 
to examine the degree to which the transformational project for the 
organisation is also transforming those who work there. 
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Chapter Five 
'Coketown' voices 
In Chapter Four, I have considered the formalities of outsourcing, its 
background in the particular case of Coketown and the relationship of that 
process to changes in the framework for inspection and the development 
of self-regulation. These are parts of the instruments of operation of 
modernisation. In this Chapter, however, I seek to assess to what degree 
modernisation is active as a concept in the beliefs and actions of those 
performing within the framework it creates. This is done through reflecting 
on focused interviews of those engaged in the process. Given the public 
face of inspection and intervention (Power, 1997, describes the audit 
process as 'dramaturgical'), I have adopted theatrical metaphors to 
describe those engaged at the local level, the 'script' being the process in 
which they are engaged, their roles perhaps allowing more scope to ad-lib 
than in some theatrical productions. 
The cast: description of 'actors' and 'witnesses' 
The evidence for the illustrative example of Coketown is drawn from a 
number of sources. They include the published inspection reports from 
OFSTED but also conversations and interviews with a number of 
individuals who were engaged in the authority, either throughout the period 
of intervention or for different periods within it. Interviews were undertaken 
with the Chair of the Coketown Education Board, the statutory Chief 
Education Officer, the intervention Contract Manager, a Primary 
Headteacher in Coketown who was a member of the Education Board, 
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representatives of the Diocesan Boards of Education for the Roman 
Catholic and Church of England authorities and the WES Advisor for the 
Authority. 
In each case, with the exception of the diocesan representatives, the 
interviews were undertaken in the interviewee's normal place of work, 
during normal working time. For reasons of convenience, the diocesan 
officers were interviewed together in a venue outside of Coketown. The 
form of the interview was semi-structured, the researcher both recording 
the interview and taking notes. Interviewees were encouraged to follow 
their train of thought, rather than answer a set of questions, although a 
common set of questions was used to prompt reflection and discussion, 
they were not asked in necessarily the same order or with identical 
phrasing or voice tone. The intention was to uncover the personal 
narrative of individuals closely concerned with a unique process. This 
sought to reveal both their own description of their role, as an 'actor' in the 
process, but also their reflections on the process itself and where that was 
apparent on the roles and actions of others as 'witnesses' to the process. 
Ball (1994) describes the data which comes from such interviews as 
'polyvocal', indicating it can be understood and interpreted in at least three 
different ways: 
'First, as (real stories'; as accounts of what happened, who said 
what, whose voices were important. What is of interest here are the 
descriptions of events, the account of character and key figures, 
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moments and debates 'inside' policy. This is the'how' of policy, the 
practicalities. 
Second, as discourse; as ways of talking about and conceptualising 
policy, the discourses which speak policy and speak the actors 
(rather than the reverse). The assertions, judgements, axioms and 
interpretations of actors are central here. The reiteration of basic 
principles in and between interviews is important. This, in a sense, 
is the 'why' of policy; the 'types of knowledge'which provide 
justification and explanations for certain policy solutions and 
exclude others. 
Third, as interest representation (but not in any simple pluralist 
sense). This is data as indicative of structural and relational 
constraints and influences which play in and upon policy making. In 
particular, the ways in which policy making within the State is 
related to the 'needs' of capital and civil society or the technical 
problems of the State itself. This is the 'because' of policy. 
Thus, any one 'slice of data' can be 'heard' via one or more mode of 
epistemological vocality and different modes let us say different 
things about policy.... By engaging with 'direct evidence' in this way 
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we are also confronted directly with complexity, unable to gloss 
over contradictions, and must face up to incoherence. ' 
(Ball, in Halpin and Troyna, (ed), 1994, p. 109). 
As indicated in his title ('Researching Inside the State: Interviewing the 
Education Policy Elite'), Ball's interviewees (Keith Joseph, Rhodes 
Boyson, Alan Ainsworth, Chairman of the FEU, Philip Merridale, former 
Chairman of the Council of Local Education Authorities, Chairman of the 
ACC Education Committee and leader of the employers negotiating body, 
the Burnham Committee) were 'elite' in education policy fields at the time 
of his work (1988). Their position, contacts and interests place them close 
to the 'because' of policy. The interviewees in this illustrative example, 
although distinguished in their own areas, are not close to the 'because' of 
intervention at the kind of level that the contemporary equivalents of Ball's 
interviewees would be. Their relationship to it is in the area of 'why' and 
'how'-'why' intervention in this case took the form it did, and the felt 
experience of its operation, the relationships it engenders, the 'how' of the 
process, its 'real story$. 
From this perspective, it may be necessary to have more context to the 
( actors' and 'witnesses' than simply a job title or description of role. Ball 
recognises 'character' as influential in accounts of policy within this 
methodology and clearly this carries significant issues for researchers. 
Individual biography will influence personal testimony and account. Issues 
of status and position can influence description and allocation of influence. 
101 
Memory can shift even over relatively short periods of time. The focus of 
the example however is not the revelation of personal story and motivation 
but rather the rounded description of intervention in action leading to 
tentative generalisation. This forces judgements to be made about the 
relevance of details of personal biography and, possibly arbitrary or 
misleading, connections to be implied between a known fact concerning 
an individual and an element of, or emphasis within, their account. In 
order to reduce such possibility, the interviewees are identified by a letter 
and only brief context given. 
Thus 'A', the Chair of the Coketown Education Board, is currently a senior 
academic in a local university, following headship in a secondary school in 
a neighbouring authority. His school teaching career has been within the 
sub regional area. 
'13', the statutory Chief Education Officer was appointed, following the 
second inspection of Coketown, from a senior position in an LEA in a 
different part of England. That LEA had not been subject to intervention 
and the Council had been rated as 'excellent' under the Comprehensive 
Performance Assessment. 
cc) , the contract manager, was appointed 
following the second inspection 
of Coketown from a chief officer position within an LEA in a different area 
of England. That Council had been rated as'fair' under the CPA and was 
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about to reorganise its structure so as to bring together education with 
children's social services functions. 
'U, the primary headteacher, had spent his entire teaching career with 
Coketown, having trained at the local college. He was in his second 
headship with the authority and was the elected chair of a voluntary 
association of a cluster of nursery, primary and special school 
headteachers. 
'E', the Diocesan Education Officer for the relevant Church of England 
Diocese had been in post for a number of years before intervention and 
through his role had insights into other LEAs within the area. 
F, the Diocesan Education Officer for the relevant Catholic Diocese had 
taken on that role following retirement from Coketown LEA where he had a 
number of senior roles, latterly as Chief Education Officer a little before 
intervention. 
'G', the WES Advisor, also served in that role in relation to a number of 
authorities within the area and also beyond. She was in post before and 
during intervention. 
From a positional perspective therefore, the range of interviews could 
produce data with different lines of sight on the history, governance and 
operation of the new management arrangements in Coketown. These will 
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incorporate the institutional, the Council, the national and those of 
engaged local agencies. They will reveal distinct but related 'real stories II 
'discourses' and representations of interest. 
Coketown before inspection 
Given his length of time as a headteacher in Coketown, D can provide a 
perspective over a number of years of the characteristics of Coketown as 
an authority in which to seek to lead a school. 
'RL: Give me a picture how, as a Head Teacher who has been 
through the system, what are your perceptions of the local authority. 
D: I had got very good perceptions of the Local Authority at that 
point (the initial headship in the late 1970's)... come through the 
ranks when X was Director who was very hands on. People like Y 
as Assistant CEO so there were a lot of people within the authority 
that I had a lot of trust in and I felt were doing good jobs. 
Decline in the Local Authority when the then director left, it 
coincided at the time when there was a lack of investment in 
education. 'Coketown' is also typified that it swings from one local 
election to the other regarding control. A lot of political interference 
in education not in the micro detail but more in the macro issues. 
Once the Director had gone it then became a different matter.... 
initially not replaced then, later, replaced by a Chief Education 
Officer who was an absolute disaster. 
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This is when the personal relationship started to fray. He/she went 
nowhere near the schools. Beginning to see the unravelling of the 
Local Authority as a Local Education Authority and so it went on. Y 
was there as acting for a while then chief for a while. I felt he did 
quite a good job. But by this time the politicians had found their feet 
and my recollection is that his time in office was at a time when it 
was moving into very left wing control. 
A senior politician at that time saw little value in education, very 
derogatory about schools and education. He saw schools as being 
a means of political change, not in terms of education having a 
value. That didn't help, it would be easy to blame the faults on this 
politician and that has been the case even now. That would be 
unfair. The unravelling was going on beforehand. He just 
accelerated it because he saw a vacuum and moved into it. 
He was the first Leader of the Council and the lead for education to 
come and speak with headteachers which is why I am a little 
cautious in saying everything was bad. There were some good 
things there that could have been capitalised on. Perhaps with more 
Chief Officer experience.... might have been able to control things a 
little better. 
It was not easy for the CEO because schools at that point were 
encouraged to be independent. There was a message coming 
through don't expect things from the centre because they are 
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rubbish, develop yourselves, be in competition, the successful 
school will get more resources, the weaker ones will wither away. A 
lot of GM schools at the time were successful financially and a 
number of schools withered. It left a bad taste in a lot of people's 
mouths. I could not see the justification for it personally. 
At the time GM status meant you were beyond the pale, you weren't 
invited to things, even things like the local consortium of schools 
froze you out and that again wasn't helpful and this led to 
fragmentation and other labels being added to other schools. 
Coketown had a very strong cluster system which fell apart. Some 
areas didn't. I 
D's account is interesting from a number of perspectives. Firstly, it sets the 
difficulties of Coketown within a particular context of developments in 
national educational policy. He relates local developments to the 
reductions in local authority expenditure during the Thatcher 
administrations and also to the impact of the market based reforms which 
supported the Grant Maintained schools initiative. His description of the 
local impact of these developments is largely negative - local cluster 
arrangements were disrupted, reductions in central expenditure meant a 
lowering of expectations about the nature of support available to schools 
from the LEA, perceptions of unfairness about resource allocation 'left a 
bad taste in a lot of people's mouths'. The latter remark rests upon a 
perception of values being subverted and a kind of retaliation taking place 
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through schools being excluded from the benefits of local networks, in a 
kind of attempt to reduce the advantage gained from the resource 
improvements. D's knowledge leads to an informed discourse which 
places local events within an understanding of policy beyond the local. 
His observations are also of use in their perceptions of the interaction of 
local and national politics. He describes his perception of a part of the local 
'elite), in this case a senior local politician, both seeking direct contact with 
headteachers, and also being perceived as denying the validity of 
education as a public good. Two issues are at play here: first, a move to 
bypass the traditional means of communication within Coketown of a 
'hands on' Chief Education Officer, a skilled professional relating directly 
with schools on behalf of the Council, by creating arenas in which lay 
members addressed them directly and, second, an affront to the 
established value system obtaining within the service. In this case, a 
perception of a 'left wing' councillor seeing schools as about'a means of 
political change' rather than 'having value I, was part of a dislocation locally 
engineered, given more power by its distance from the national agenda of 
competition reinforcing rather than challenging social hierarchies. In this 
way, schools are described as subject to contrary pressures from local and 
nationalagendas. 
Third, he describes changes to the officer group leading to a position 
where 'the personal relationship started to fray'. Perceptions of officer 
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inexperience or incompetence leads to a deterioration in 'trust' and an 
9 unravelling). 
What is being described is a coming together of local and national policy at 
a time of uncertain professional and personal relationship. D has a 
particular kind of knowledge of this, gained from insight but also 
longitudinally, his years of service giving a weight to his perception that a 
newly arrived analyst could not match. The perceived value of his views, 
the degree to which they were acknowledged as grounded and local 
became in itself a factor in the development of education in Coketown. 
These perceptions are largely echoed in F's account of the same 
chronological period. He describes, 'One of the big problems of the 
Council. ' as being I its politics). 
'Winning political battles became the aim. They lost sight of service 
delivery. It had nothing to do with service delivery. Both Labour and 
Conservatives were divided internally. It was internecine warfare - 
coming out in the Council Chamber. Nothing was decided. They 
had one year without a Director of Education. The failure to decide 
took one year. Things started to drift. 
F went on to talk about the relationship between members and officers: 
'There was a deliberate desire to remove people who had been 
there a long time. They wanted completely new blood. The package 
was good. ) 
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This analysis offers insights into the difficulties of governance which the 
authority was creating. In a system in which, by D's account, continuity of 
personal relationships and perceptions of competence were important, the 
Council, as an act of policy, was seeking to make radical change in the 
officer cadre, effectively to politicise the administration. 
It could be argued that the Council was seeking its own understanding of 
9 modernisation'. The changes it made at the same time included 
establishing neighbourhood committees and seeking to delegate 
resources to them alongside creating a more 'strategic 1, less service 
based, organisational structure. However, the initiative taken at the 'site of 
action and discourse' (Raab, in Halpin and Troyna, (ed), 1994, p. 24) which 
the Council represents is disengaging with the discourse at other sites, at 
the institutional level, through an absence of communication and 
explanation. 
Inspection and its aftermath 
The initial 1999 inspection judged: 
'The LEA has been able to contribute little to improvement in school 
performance in recent years. For much of the 1990s, political 
instability, evidenced in successive administrations and culminating 
at one stage in the virtual paralysis of the decision-making process, 
has handicapped practical action on education I. 
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It went on: 
'This LEA is not adequately discharging two general 
responsibilities: - to exercise its functions with a view to raising 
standards in schools, and to use its resources efficiently. I 
There was doubt regarding its capacity to make the improvements needed 
at a sufficient pace. The local reaction to that judgement gives further 
weight to the discontinuity between the sites of action and discourse in the 
authority. 
D recalls: 
'The first OFSTED inspection occurred. The Chief Inspector at that 
time had the makings of a good chief inspector but never got the 
opportunity to develop that role because suddenly he was made 
acting Chief Education Officer. Then suddenly we have an OFSTED 
Inspection - so was it any wonder that things fell apart? I can 
remember the Acting CEO talking to heads, giving the news that the 
Local Authority had come out extremely badly but that the 
inspectors decided that schools were not part of the problem and 
would be looking for their support in the next 12 months. The feeling 
of headteachers was that it served them right because the Local 
Authority had not given any support to schools when they had bad 
inspections now they would know what it felt like. I commented at 
the meeting that the Local Authority is in a mess and OFSTED has 
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shown that and that we have got to be part of the solution. We have 
got to work with the LA and the headteachers agreed to (do so). I 
The initial reaction of the Local Authority was to seek to recall an earlier 
style of relationship - looking to the 'support' of schools. Given the 
perception of a deliberate fracturing of old relationships by the Local 
Authority, a local version of 'modern isation 11 it is perhaps predictable that 
there were mixed views among headteachers. D's view, based upon a 
value set which prioritises locality, apparently attracted some support. 
D's account of the next stage is as follows: 
'What then happened was the Chief Executive and the Chair of 
Education wanted to move things forward, working with OFSTED. 
[A firm of accountants and management consultants] was brought 
in. The Local Authority decided to set up a stakeholder forum as 
part of their response and that consisted of a number key 
stakeholders, headteacher representatives, diocesan 
representatives, political representatives, chaired by the Chair of 
Education. It had a very vague brief at that early stage. 
The politicians were fighting with Whitehall to keep education. DfES 
wanted to remove control completely. In the end because of all 
sorts of issues a compromise deal was reached where education 
control would not be taken away but it would be dealt with 
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differently. This is what [the consultants] came up with - the 
suggestion it would be done with a private contractor. ) 
On this account, the key decision to outsource, the 'because' of this policy 
initiative, was a compromise between the Council's desire to retain control 
of its education functions and the WES view that they should be removed. 
The account of the WES officer has important differences: 
RL I'm trying to get different perspectives on this. What is your 
perspective of the vision following the first inspection of 99 and the 
decision to go for intervention. Do you have a sense of how that 
was reached? 
G Me did not see any alternative. There were beginning to be 
several models by that stage.... In Coketown, there was such denial 
at all levels - elected members and senior officers - that there was 
anything wrong that we couldn't see how we could move forward 
without looking totally differently. There wasn't any awareness, 
there was complete and utter disbelief; 
RL: They didn't accept the OFSTED judgement? 
G: Neither did they accept the [consultant] judgement. So all you 
would hear was, 'We can do it, we know what is best for Coketown, I 
when all of the evidence was saying that they were not managing it 
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in an effective way and were not addressing the needs. At that 
stage they had been completely and utterly deserted by their 
schools as well. So you have got denial at council level, denial at 
senior officer level and complete rejection of the LEA by the 
schools. I 
There are some differences of detail in the accounts -G suggesting no 
support for the LEA from its schools, D suggesting there was some 
support remaining - but that is not in itself of real significance. What is 
revealing is the consistency of perception between the school site of 
discourse and that of national government. In both arenas, outsourcing 
was essentially perceived as a pragmatic action, related to a particular set 
of circumstances, a fix. In third way terms, something 'that works'. 
G describes the process between the initial inspection and the initial 
outsourcing involving a firm of consultants: 
G: We had the OFSTED report, which was the worst OFSTED 
report that we had had, but we find that the advisory team are not 
aware of this because they have been advised that it is one of the 
best. Then we put in [consultants] to test this out. I was trying to 
provide triangulation on the ground. We had an intervention team 
and I had a team leader attached to me who was liaising with me 
and operating in house as well. We were having a series of 
meetings with Chief Executive, other officers, elected members, 
[consultants], schools and teachers, to formulate a picture of where 
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we were. We then got to a position where a recommendation had 
to be made. [The consultants] recommendation was made - which 
was complete outsourcing at that point. That was not the final 
decision I. 
Again, at this point, what Ball described as the difficulties of dealing with 
'direct evidence', its complexity, contradictions and incoherence, are 
apparent. Within the framework of a 'modernising' government, a report 
from the national inspectorate doubting capacity and a report from a 
consultant recommending outsourcing, it seems perverse that at this stage 
it was not 'the final decision'. G describes the 'real story' of political 
compromise: ' 
G [The process] was highly confidential. There was nowhere we 
could go because local politicians had asked that we hold it [the 
consultant's report] until after the local elections. As it happened 
there was a change in control. This was in May 2000/01. It returned 
as a hung council, where we had an 'issue by issue' agreement 
between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. It was not a 
coalition and again we had people in denial. You can direct but you 
can't make people do things, so in the end we felt the best thing to 
do was to compromise. What do you do if politicians and officers 
are potentially working against everything you are trying to do all 
the way through, frustrating and [tape unclear], and in a way it was 
seen as a compromise gesture. So what happened, even though 
we had the ... report that says 'outsource the lot', the two party 
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leads were brought down to London and there was a meeting 
between ... our own ministers, social services and 
it was possible 
that the ODPIVI were going to be involved. It was finally determined 
we would partially outsource and they would retain part of it - to 
show us what they could do. And then we went through the 
procurement process. 
Coming out of that meeting they still felt they had education and at 
the same time we still felt we had taken sufficient away for it to be 
moved forward. ' 
At play in this meeting were a number of issues and a reading of G's 
account, analysing its 'epistemological vocality', provides insights into 
them. 
At the level of personal testimony, there is the sense of the impatience of 
the professional officer, with a commission to undertake, being frustrated 
by the lack of cooperation of those with whom they must work to 
accomplish it. There is also, though understated here, the sense of 
professional mission to make something defective operational again, 
despite potential personal discomfort. There is also the sense of 'team )I 
both accounting to the individual, and a wider team of which the individual 
forms a part. In studies of policy, this personal element, of an individual 
determined to see something through, may be missing from accounts, 
particularly those of difficult policy areas. It is difficult to see which study 
discipline could most readily accommodate and value such evidence. 
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As G speaks however she is also conceptualising the policy as one of 
compromise, prioritising what would work, what could be agreed ahead of 
what was apparently right upon the basis of the evidence available to 
policy makers. It was axiomatic that something 'sufficient ... 
for it to be 
moved forward' was the aim of bringing parties together rather than the 
simple exercise of power. There is also the sense of the coming together 
within this event of other policy streams from beyond support for school 
improvement, which was the focus of the 1999 Ofsted framework, with 
wider government agendas. These are personified on this stage as 
ministers for local government, 'our own) ministers from WES, alongside 
social services and others from ODPM. In G's phrasing, 'we'would 
partially outsource, while 'they'would retain part of it. The 'we' of this 
process engages the many facets of government but not, in this analysis, 
the local authority. The 'they I, the local authority, are conceptualised as 
distinct from 'us 
3, 
the ministers and officials of the central state. 
There is also here a sense of the creation point of 'real world policy I, the 
point at which the theorising about the flexibilities of the market, the 
analysis of options, the creation of powers of intervention and direction 
through parliament and the assessment of inspection reports meets the 
other reality of local electoral mandate and personal agenda. In Ball's 
phrase, these are the 'structural and relational' constraints of interest 
representation as they grind out compromise. As G remarked elsewhere: 
'We worried whether it would stick. ' 
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Her comment, 'You can direct, but you can't make people do things' goes 
to the heart of real world policy. Structural power, gained from statute and 
the power to write and pass legislation, has, ultimately, limited impact in a 
pluralist state. The degree to which the intentions of legislators can induce 
change depends on the cooperation and collaboration of intermediary 
bodies. Each of these centres of change or disruption contains within it its 
own elites, its own discourses of policy, its own individual stories, all 
combining to change or amend the intentions of policy makers. Elsewhere, 
G talks about the degree to which, at WES level, at the time of this 
intervention, there was: 'a wedded view that there had to be a middle tier, 
and that actually acted as a translator of our policy and quality assurance. ' 
That 'wedding' however was not necessarily with a local authority, 
particularly if it proved incapable of translating 'our' policy and quality 
assurance into effective activity at the local level. G describes the local 
interpretation by a senior local member of the compromise of partial 
outsourcing to be 'We've won. ' Given the observation of F about the 
degree to which within the local political culture the 'winning of battles' had 
become the aim, divorced from service delivery, it seems likely that there 
were a number of interpretations by the compromise achieved through the 
meeting G describes. As a basis for the operation of a wholly new 
relationship between central government, Coketown and a yet to be 
identified third partner, hindsight would suggest that the compromise had 
glossed over rather than resolved the underlying tensions within the 
service. 
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Indeed, the instability of this arrangement could be seen as contributing 
directly to the findings of the 2002 inspection and the further outsourcing 
that followed. G has an interesting insight into this process, believing that 
although the further outsourcing would require change on the part of the 
authority: 
'(We) also had to change [the contractor]. We couldn't just extend 
the contract with that team. ) 
This process was described as 'prodding the supplier' and in the event led 
to a change by the contractor in the senior management of the Coketown 
contract. It was not thought necessary to re-tender or in other ways 
change the contractor. The necessary changes were 'possible from the 
first agreement'. 
The new manager of the contract, interviewee C, was an appointment of 
the contractor, involving the Stakeholder Board in the assessment. 
Following the critical OFSTED report, the Council also changed its Chief 
Education Officer, appointing interviewee B, at this time then to have the 
role of CEO in an authority whose main functions were to be delivered 
under contract by an outside contractor. For these individuals, the new 
relationships created by the performance culture of modernisation, with 
matters of contract at their centre, were an option of choice, not imposition. 
Both came to their roles directly from senior positions within local 
education authorities. To paraphrase Whitty, their testimony relates, 
therefore, to the point at which their own personal biographies begin to 
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intersect with the history of policy. It speaks of the uncertainty of new 
professionalisms, of the continuation of habits of mind and the ensuing 
codes of conduct, of the stubborn persistence of the public service within 
the modernised relationship between the Council and its agent. 
Life under intervention: contracts and values 
The rhetoric of intervention speaks of the importance of contract and the 
clarity it brings to relationships, the clear focus it provides on outcomes. In 
G's retelling, a firm of accountants were engaged to advise the Council on 
the contractual elements of the process: 
'We were looking for a whole new language. We wanted quality 
assurance, performance indicators, penalty mechanisms, 
attainment targets, penalty clauses.. we had quite a degree of 
autonomy. We wanted something concise, which had sharpness 
and clarity, something which enabled, not constricted.... It was not 
to cost a fortune. We would pay for transition costs ...... The 
contracts were tailored to context. None of them are the same. We 
were learning. ) 
G is describing a key feature of the modernising process, the central place 
of performativity. In a study of assessment policy in the late twentieth 
century. Broadfoot characterises performativity as: 
'Rooted in a rationalistic assumption that it is possible - and, 
indeed, desirable - to 'measure' performance, whether this be of the 
individual pupil or of the institution as a whole, the concept of 
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9 performativity' arguably represents one of the clearest expressions 
of modernist thinking. I 
(Broadfoot in Phillips and Furlong, (ed), 2001, pp. 136 - 7) 
The'whole new language'G describes is the language of modernism 
applied at the level of the LEA. The effort of assessment at pupil level, 
connected to apparent assessment at institutional level through league 
tables of school 'performance', (actually pupil performance in standardised 
tests and public examinations), would be connected through contract to 
the payment of a private sector organisation managing a public education 
service. The process seeks to take out or limit some of the variables, for 
example cost (it was 'not to cost a fortune'), but would provide new 
information on methods of delivery of services. The 'rational assumption) 
here is that the activity of an LEA can be related directly to the 
performance of children and young people in public assessments and that 
payment to a contractor will provide incentive to the contractor to increase 
that measured performance. It is also assumed that such a relationship 
can be captured in and expressed through a contractual document which 
will be central to the activity of the contractor and provide the context for 
the activity of the client. In this case the 'client'would be the Local 
Authority, holding the contractor to account on behalf of the local 
community. 
In the case of Coketown, the interface between the democratically 
accountable body (the LEA) and the contractor is through an appointed 
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Board with an appointed and paid chair. The chair of the Coketown 
education Board, A, describes the relationship in these terms: 
RL As a board what is their role? Is it about management or 
governance, or both or neither 
A It has a direct role in monitoring the contract. If all else stops, 
that is what it does and as such is expected to offer appropriate 
challenge to the contractor or to the LEA. The contract is interesting 
in the way it is constructed, the majority of the targets in the 
contract would fall to Education Coketown, but to achieve this they 
would have to work in partnership with the LEA through [the 
statutory Chief Education Officer]. So what has become apparent, 
as this has grown, is it is too simplistic to think you are just 
monitoring activities of Education Coketown. If you can imagine 
within its own role it is almost an artificial division, well that is where 
the contractor stopped and where people from the LEA started. I 
don't think that was fully understood at the start of its conception. 
To discharge that role the board has to work in with the type of 
other committee structures that would be found in other Local 
Authorities' context - that is scrutiny - and do that through the 
interface of elected members and officers who attend the Board. 
They [the officers of the contractor] don't directly attend any of the 
other council committees quite deliberately. ' 
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A is outlining an interesting set of relationships of account in his 
description of the governance of education in Coketown. The body 
charged with monitoring the contractual relationship between the LEA and 
the contractor has enacted that role in such a way as to create a 
relationship of account between the LEA and the Board. However, rather 
than describing this relationship in terms which indicate its, difference from 
other models, its 'modernism ;IA chooses a comparator from within the 
governance of the public sector. Local authorities have engaged in the 
creation of internal relationships of account through the creation of scrutiny 
boards and panels as part of their response to local government reform 
more widely. The model created in Coketown, although seen as unique, 
nevertheless is consistent with more general local government practice at 
the end of the twentieth and start of the twenty first century. Its modernism 
is moderated by convention. 
Within the framework of governance created by the Board, the key 
professional relationship is that between the statutory chief officer and the 
manager of the Education Coketown contract. The statutory officer 
describes the role of the contract within that relationship in these terms: 
B There is very little relationship to jolp description or person spec. 
that I came with except in so far that clearly the basis for the 
arrangements here is a contract between ourselves and a private 
sector partner. I have to say that the contact itself is slightly better 
than useless. The important thing for me is that the contract doesn't 
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capture the essence of what we are trying to achieve. I have got a 
strong view that there was an expectation when I arrived in the way 
that the interim had performed the role, that the role would be a 
contract monitor to be the client of the contract and within that being 
very pernickety. Making sure the details of contract were being 
delivered and to establish a client team to support me to rigorously 
monitor, scrutinise and to hold to account the performance of the 
contract. 
I decided very quickly having read the contract that I needed to step 
back and ask myself what were the local authority and other 
partners trying to achieve when it signed up to that set of 
arrangements and to what extent did the contract itself get in the 
way of some of those things and therefore to try and focus on the 
relationship with the partner. People had used the words 'strategic 
partner' so I saw my role being what is the Local Authority side of 
being a strategic partner. 
So from that point of view I saw myself doing two main things. 
Firstly, ensuring that the strategic partner we were working with 
offered real value to the council in terms of impact to schools and 
educational standards in the borough and, secondly, making sure 
that the strategic partner was also part of the wider ambitions of 
transforming the borough that we had. 
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From the strategic partner's point of view what I was trying to do as 
well was to make sure that the rest of the council could be aligned 
as far as it could be to support the objectives of raising educational 
standards. So I am really at the interface of the two strategic 
partners and I see my role very much as mediating the relationship, 
making sure it is an effective and strong relationship and that's 
been a challenge. I 
In his description of his role, B wants to make a clear distinction between 
the role apparently assigned to him within the formal structure of 
intervention and the lived experience of that role. Rather than becoming an 
enactor of performativity, B sets out to create a different role within this 
framework, starting from a different set of inherent principles and values 
than those underpinning the nature of contract. In asking himself these 
questions and proceeding to enact his answers within the context of this 
new relationship, B is creating a localised modernism of his own, rooted in 
I mediation' rather than enforcement. 
When describing the other pole of this relationship, the contract manager 
describes a similar relationship with the central formal feature of the 
modernised operation, the contract: 
C: Indeed in many ways B and I will throw the contract in the bin 
because sometimes it may be that if you followed it to the letter it 
would be bad practice ( i. e. statementing) The contract focuses very 
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much on year 6 or GCSE year 9. Again this would not be in the best 
interest for Coketown. For me that key is that education ought to be 
the route of local democracy but that is a government issue not a 
management issue. So B and I will go together to see the cabinet 
member to talk through an issue. Once they have said that is what 
they wanted we will come back, consult and go through the process 
and then go back and say we think this is the way we ought to go. 
So the professional decision is left entirely up to us and the political 
context and the leadership and vision come from members. B has 
been brilliant, although we don't always agree. Whereas his 
predecessor had spent his time setting traps to see if you would fall 
into them. ' 
The experience here provides insight into one possible outcome of the 
modernised relationship for new professional practice, the notion of 
contract monitoring through the 'setting' of 'traps'. C describes a different 
outcome: 
C: What I am doing is improving the education service: what B is 
doing is making this work at the other side which is almost unique. 
Because of the way we are having to work together the politicians 
are more sold on it. They have recognised that they have still got 
the power. The person it has been hardest for is the Chief 
Executive because it is government not management. 
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Here, C demonstrates an interest by elected members in governance 
('government' in the transcript but the sense is clear) as distinct from 
management as the key to the operation of local democracy within the 
framework created by the Local Government Act 2000. This new 
framework for the delivery of the service is seen as capable of delivering 
that distinction - members assent to a degree of management freedom 
comes from a recognition that in other ways they still have 'the power I. 
Elsewhere, 'C' describes the difficulty the local authority apparently 
previously had in recognising that distinction: 
C: [T]his is where I think the modern agenda can pay off. Even the 
best authorities find it hard to separate government and 
management and they find it very hard and challenging at times to 
keep their hands away from things they should not be touching. 
This was never more true than any where than Coketown, it was 
famous for it. When I first arrived, Councillors would phone and say, 
'My next door neighbour's child needs a statement and we want 
them to go to an independent school, ' and ask me to sort it out.. 
There was also the issue that if you are a Chief Officer and you end 
up upsetting a Councillor because you don't do what they want 
because you see it as being improper, the next time that you see 
them they may be listening to a grievance against you from a 
member of staff. They don't have this power over me. That 
separation in a place like Coketown was absolutely essential. I 
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C is describing a confusion regarding the nature of the role of the elected 
member in the changing sets of relationships created by the 1988 
Education Reform Act and subsequently developed. In their 1996 study of 
the 'state of play' in LEAs, Radnor and Ball observe: 
'LEAs are now operating in a kind of organisational and political 
twilight world where issues of accountability and democratic politics 
are often obscured in deep shadow. Being accountable for 
stewardship, in Simey's terms, is no longer clear cut and therefore 
open to a variety of interpretations arising out of different LEA 
cu Itu res. ) 
(Radnor and Ball, 1996, p. 52 ) 
C describes the intervention by an elected member in relation to the 
supposed special needs of the child of a constituent as inherently 
inappropriate, part of a failure to distinguish between governance and 
management. This is related to asserted potential difficulties in relation to 
personnel and disciplinary procedures, a circumstance in which the power 
of elected members may be used to 'pay back' an officer for a reluctance 
to cooperate in an area where an officer has delegated authority in an area 
where decision making power rests with elected members. The new 
relationship of 'the modern agenda' is described in terms of a new 
description of power at the operational level. Although authority is drawn 
from the elected body, operational decision is effectively distanced from 
the source of power. 
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However, given the reference by Radnor and Ball to the existence of 
different LEA'cultures ', what in effect is being described is a structural 
response to an issue of organisational culture, a particular response to a 
culture seen at its most extreme in Coketown (it was famous for it') rather 
than an inevitable consequence of the earlier political and service delivery 
arrangements. What is being described here are changes in the 
organisational and political culture of the Authority, stemming from the 
drama of intervention. 
B describes the place in this new culture of the formal complaint 
relationship: 
RL Can I tease out a couple of elements? Where, within this, the 
nature of the contract sits? Is it actually on the shelf? 
B: The three large boxes at the end are the contract. When I arrived 
I read them religiously and I read them before I was interviewed. So 
one of the things I noticed there were significant gaps and, as 
always, they captured arrangement at a point in time. What they 
didn't do, they didn't appreciate significantly the intangibles that you 
need to actually improve education in the borough and if you go into 
it as a contractual relationship and just that, I think all of the 
important intangibles don't happen. 
One example, which I think is the key turning point. When I arrived 
somebody had spent a huge amount [of time] negotiating the level 
of performance they would expect and the WES had been involved. 
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What level of performance would we expect for KS3 5A- Cs? And 
then for each one they had identified a band with penalties and 
bonuses. So the contract negotiations were really about what the 
relative level of bonuses and incentives might be. So the 
performance measurement was very much, 'Here is a set of points 
you have to reach, and if you don't you get a penalty, and if you 
over-shoot you get a bonus. 'Although there was a cap put on the 
bonus, so the incentive was to improve performance so far but no 
further. 
I got the Cabinet to agree that any penalties that we'd be eligible 
for, as a result of underperforming that summer, we would reinvest 
in school budgets the following autumn - the reason being, it just 
seemed a little bit absurd that, if there was contract 
underperformance, it would mean that pupils had not reached levels 
across the borough... I then went back to [the contractor] and said, 
'What about you and your bonusesT - because actually, there is 
something amiss if they are going to take bonuses for driving up 
standards and what I wanted to do was get it recognised that there 
is an important element that, if you're providing a service, you 
should get a management fee for providing that service.... It is 
actually hard to have a relationship when we are trying to agree 
performance objectives for the year that has got financial 
implication for both of us, as opposed to a partnership, where it 
stays within a pot of money that has been allocated to education. In 
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effect what happens is, where there is a penalty or bonus we then, 
as partners, agree to use it to fund key priority programmes. For 
example, the penalties from my year 1 were used to set up nursery 
centres in our primary schools and also an ICT programme. ' 
In reflecting on the purpose of intervention, rather than its manifestation in 
terms of contract and finance, B creates a different set of drivers for 
change. The recognition that a contract including capped bonuses for 
improved performance could act as an incentive to limit performance 
improvement and that penalties for underperformance could lead to 
reduced rather than sustained investment by the Council in its education 
service go to the heart of the contradictions inherent in the contracting 
culture. Rather than producing a clear focus upon outcomes, the 
relationship in practice produces other priorities: 'It is actually hard to have 
a relationship when we are trying to agree performance objectives for the 
year that has got financial implications for both of us'. Such discussions 
may lead to questions from the Council's side such as, 'How much 
improvement can the Council affordT or, from the contractor's perspective, 
'How modest can we make the improvements before we start earning 
bonuses? ' 
In Coketown they have achieved a local resolution to this dilemma by 
talking in terms of 'partnership' rather than client and contractor, and 
putting aside the key element of bonus as part of the performance 
framework and agreeing to a process of joint investment. Clearly, for this 
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to be supportable commercially, the contractor must recognise the 'flat fee I 
as attractive in itself. As C describes it: 
'The profit issue was negotiated as part of the contract negotiation 
and I have given them some of it but not all. They have been happy 
with that. ; 
In describing the treatment of bonus C indicates; 
'It is not a huge amount and what [B] and I have both committed to 
was who ever put the money in it would stay in education services. ) 
In terms of the distinct culture being created within this intervention, it is 
interesting that the parent company of the local contractor is described as 
'them' and 'they', whereas the local investment in looked - after children 
was something 'we' undertook. This is pointing to the creation of a local 
culture within the framework of the commercial and public service 
interface. The perspective of the primary headteacher, long serving in 
Coketown and a member of the Coketown Education Board reflects this: 
RL: Why has it worked here?. 
D: I think it has worked because people have made it work. We 
have been taken to the edge of the precipice and it has worked 
because there was a feeling that, if we could control the contract, 
education would stay locally. It took me a while to get my head 
around a private contractor managing such a large part of the LEA 
service. I got around it because we felt that we could control things 
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as long as there was the contract and openness and transparency 
and that things were getting into schools and that tangible 
improvements were being seen by the public and the politicians. 
And we were committed to making [the Coketown Education Board] 
work and schools were committed to making the new situation 
work. 
One of the things that had come through the first of the contracts 
was that the Local Authority was way behind other authorities.... So 
there was great concern in schools that this second opportunity be 
one that was capitalised on as much as possible.... We felt involved, 
we became part of the contract, we bought into it emotionally and 
philosophically'. 
Significantly, D does not engage with the assumption within the question 
that intervention has 'worked'. The reply sits within a view that 
improvements have been achieved, that it has helped the Authority 
become contemporary, and that it is no longer'way behind other 
authorities'. The characteristics of this improvement stem from the drama 
of intervention -'We have been taken to the edge of the precipice' - and 
the desire that'education would stay locally'. Rather than being perceived 
as outsourcing, the contractual procurement of services from a private 
company, the intervention was perceived as an opportunity for more local 
involvement. In D's telling phrase, 'we became part of the contract'. The 
contract which is implicit here is not necessarily the one between 
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Coketown and its contractor; it is rather the notion of a local civil contract 
involving public agencies, based on values of openness and partnership. 
As the contract manager indicates, 'it is odd that after many years of public 
service you still have the same set of values. ) 
The contracting process has not transformed or replaced what might be 
described as 'public service values'. Rather it has created an environment 
within Coketown in which they can be rediscovered from the confusion of 
the Council's difficulties in 'the organisational and political twilight' it was in 
following the legislative changes of the late 1980s and 1990s. 
This conclusion is important in terms of the potential of the modernising 
project to transform local authorities and schools and also with regard to 
the next stages of the reform programme for local authorities, schools and 
other services for children. These will be considered in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Six 
Towards an understanding of Imodernisation' 
In this chapter, I draw upon the analysis developed in Chapter Three of the 
issues which have driven educational reform since the middle of the last 
century, and the insights into the performance and inspection framework 
developed around Local Education Authorities, along the analysis of their 
practical expression given in Chapters Four and Five, in order to develop a 
rounded account of the current state of the modernising project. In this, I 
consider, in particular, its relationship to workforce reform, the WES Five 
Year Strategy, (DfES, 2004), an analysis of the overall effectiveness of 
outsourcing and the potential implications of the Children Act 2004. From 
this, I outline the likely next steps in the reform of schools and local 
authorities and their implications for local governance. Within this, I am 
seeking a response to the research question about the capacity of 
modernisation to transform the public provision of an education service. 
The 'moving target' 
'Modernisation' has been used as a consistent description of its policy 
intentions by the Labour Government. As a descriptor, it continues to 
require investigation to explain its meaning and its characteristics. In the 
education service, those meanings relate to an education system 
characterised by an emphasis on measured performance and audited 
practice, given incentive to perform in ways approved by government by 
the possibility of intervention in the event of failure. In relation to local 
authorities, modernisation implies an encouragement to place operational 
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matters in the hands of private sector companies and through that place 
themselves in the role of consumer rather than provider of services in their 
areas. 
The idea of a 'modernising' government is central to the government's 
sense of its own identity and purpose. On 30 September 1997, the newly 
elected Prime Minister, Tony Blair, addressed the Labour Party's annual 
Conference. He said: 
'The size of our victory imposes a very special responsibility on us. 
To be a government of high ideals and hard choices. Not popular 
for one time but remembered for all time. Not just a better 
government than the Tories but one of the great, radical, reforming 
Governments of our history. To modernise Britain as we 
modernised the Labour Party 
Our goal: to make Britain the best educated and skilled country in 
the world; a nation not of the few talents, but of all the talents. And 
every single part of our schools system must be modernised to 
achieve it. I 
(Blair, 1997) 
At the beginning therefore of the new government's term of office, a 
concept of 'modern isation' was being attached to its programme of change 
in the schools system, and, through the reference to skills, to the 
education service more generally. This is described as part of a process of 
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modernisation, begun with the Labour Party in opposition, exemplified by 
the revision to Clause 4 of the Party's constitution, which withdrew from its 
historic commitment to public ownership. This modernisation is now to be 
applied to the nation more generally. Implicit here is the recognition that a 
I modern ised' society would require I modernised' schools and also that the 
process of modernising schools would itself be part of the modernising of 
Britain. The rhetorical tone implies that this will be a process of 'reform' 
and 'radical' in its sweep. 
Clearly on an occasion such as that, it would not be appropriate to 
anticipate a detailed set of policy descriptions. At a party conference, 
9 modernisation' could be a term of aspiration, to be interpreted by listeners 
largely in their own way. In government, however, definitions would need 
to be provided. Whitty characterises the approach of the Labour 
government in this way: 
'The new language was to be that of 'partnership', partnership 
between schools, partnership between schools and parents, 
partnership between schools and their LEAs, and even partnership 
between the public and the private sectors. I 
(Whitty, 2002, p. 127) 
Certainly set against the most recent approach by central government to 
educational reform, characterised by competition and choice, 
collaborative approaches would be distinct. In reality, however, 
modernisation could not be characterised as a process of negotiation and 
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collaborative endeavour. Rather, indeed, evidence of modernisation in 
action points to more areas of continuity rather than departure from with 
the Policy position inherited by Labour in 1997. These elements can be 
captured in the decision of government to carry forward its programme of 
reform largely within the distribution of powers and responsibilities set out 
in the 1988 Education Reform Act, passed by the Conservative 
administration, and intended through the devolution of resources to 
institutional level, and the reduction of the role of local authorities as 
planning organisations, to allow for the development of overtly competitive 
relationships between schools. 
In such a way it would be tempting to regard 'modernisation' as a solely 
rhetorical device, used to give an impression of radical departure, rather 
than its substance. However, this would be to undervalue the significance 
of the term, both to the receivers of policy and to its authors. Nevertheless, 
the term requires analysis to explore its meaning in the language of New 
Labour. 
Speaking in 2002, Matthew Taylor, Director of Policy for the Labour Party 
in 1997 and latterly Director of the Institute of Public Policy and Research, 
said: 
'Modernisation was called a rebranding exercise; it also helped to 
reinforce the public's view of the Tories as being clapped out. And 
as the defenders of the strategy could point out, modernisation has 
always been central to the progressive message..... New Labour 
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can be applauded for reminding us of this, after much of the 80s 
when much of the left Labour discourse had the subtext, 'Stop the 
modern world, I want to get off. ' .... And modernisation also appears 
to be good politics, if you can persuade people that the world is 
changing and that you are the only party prepared for that change, 
well you have what looks like an open and shut case I. 
(Taylor, 2002) 
This indicates the approach needed to discuss modernisation in this 
context. It will be a term that resists definition, which is unregulated by 
ideology, which is capable of describing opposing and contradictory 
events. Elsewhere in his lecture, Taylor says: 
'One of the reasons I contend it is so hard to analyse New Labour is 
that we are shooting at a moving target). 
(Taylor, 2002) 
That'moving target I, that absence of a fixed or ideological position, allows 
the party, politically, to ally itself to people's perceptions of change in their 
own lives and gives a sense of control over that change. It has been 
central to the retention of office by New Labour. It has provided a contrast 
of perception with a party describing itself as 'Conservative', and therefore 
fixed in relation to social change in an apparent stance of opposition. It has 
provided a transcending description of policy, beyond 'left' and 'right', at 
once flexible and uplifting. It is its own justification, creates its own criteria, 
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and measures its own success. It has harnessed change as a political 
resource rather than as a series of problems to be overcome. 
However, in a way consistent with the method of the on-line third way 
debate, by examining some of the characteristics of 'modernisation' in 
action, it will be possible to define its characteristics through analysing its 
practice rather than expecting an inclusive ideological source. 
Education and the state 
First, modernisation accepts that responsibility for the school system rests 
with government. In its ambition to modernise 'every single part of the 
schools system', the government's reforms would affect teachers, schools 
and local authorities in relation to their school responsibilities. This places 
the modernising agenda at some distance from that advocated by other 
commentators with a similar interest in reform. 
Tooley, for example, argues: 
'The fundamental question of education policy is what role there 
should be for the state in education. This book sets out why I 
believe there is no justified role'. 
(Tooley, 2000, p. 23) 
Following Chubb and Moe (1990,1992), Tooley goes beyond the debate 
about the relationship of schools to LEAs in order to look at the underlying 
issue of whether schools need a relationship with any of the direct arms of 
elected bodies, local or national. He examines arguments on relation to 
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state provision of education, and discards them in favour of what he sees 
as genuinely market-based alternatives. He argues that despite market- 
like reforms being introduced into the education system in England, (such 
as those following the 1988 Education Act, described by Chubb and Moe, 
from an American perspective as, potentially, 'the most significant 
educational development in either country during the post war era' (Chubb 
and Moe, 1992, p. 50)), those reforms have fallen a long way short of the 
creation of an authentic market. Such a purer system would recognise that 
education need have no relationship with the state and could be provided 
by competing educational enterprises, with choice being exercised by 
consumersi using vouchers or learning accounts to provide resources to 
make competition worthwhile. He argues that accountability can be 
exercised within markets, and ultimately through the courts, without 
recourse to political systems. Indeed, he argues that accountability based 
in the market is more genuine in that it offers recourse (or refund) rather 
than what he characterises as the self serving of a cumbersome, opaque 
and ineffective political accountability (Tooley, 2000). 
In this analysis, he accepts the Chubb and Moe prescription regarding 
schools as autonomous (Chubb and Moe, 1990). However, he assumes 
that the market systems within which schools will exist will be more 
conducive to autonomy than local democratic ones. This analysis is 
consistent with the underpinning philosophy of the Education Reform Act 
and forms an alternative way forward for a new government. However, 
such a deregulated approach is difficult to reconcile politically for a 
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government which claims that education is its 'top priority'. An 
administration, which had to subject itself to re-election, could not 
describe as a 'top priority' something for which it accepted responsibility 
but over which it had no control. New Labour's approach has been to 
accept responsibility for the issue and set out a programme of intended 
improvement. Through this decision, the improvement of individual 
schools has become a responsibility of the state. Pupil performance has 
gained democratic value. 
Giddens locates this thinking within the third way programme: 
'To retain or regain legitimacy, states without enemies have to 
elevate their administrative efficiency... Most governments still 
have a good deal to learn from business best practice - for 
instance, target controls, effective auditing, flexible decision 
structures and increased employee participation - the last of these 
being a factor in democratisation. Social democrats must respond 
to the criticism that, lacking market discipline, state institutions 
become lazy and the services they deliver shoddy'. 
(Giddens, 1998, pp. 74 - 5) 
The elements which Giddens identifies with the best practice of business 
can be 'read across' into New Labour's programme for educational 
reform. 'Target controls', in the form of performance targets and 
indicators, have become a central feature of educational planning, with 
performance targets being set at government, local authority and school 
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level. 'Auditingp, through the analysis of performance information by the 
Audit Commission, WES and other bodies, has become an increasing 
feature of the relationship between public authorities at local level and 
central government, allied to inspection at institutional and LEA level. 
'Flexible structures' are being developed beyond local authorities through 
the creation of agencies to manage programmes and the introduction of 
private sector operations into local authorities. Through these 
characteristics, intervention in LEAs sits securely within the modernising 
framework. 
A further characteristic of 'modernisation' therefore is a preoccupation 
with a version of efficiency taken from the private sector and expressed 
through employment and monitoring structures. These can be seen in the 
approach taken to modernising both the teaching profession and local 
authorities. 
The reinvention of teacher professionalism 
In relation to teachers and other staff in school, the 'democratisationy 
Giddens perceives in effective business practice - relating to increased 
participation by employees - might be seen as only partially achieved, at 
least in some key areas. It might be argued that efforts to secure 
increased employment flexibilities at school level through the Workforce 
Agreement, (DfES 2003) form part of a process of democratisation. Such 
an agreement was intended to be signed by representatives of central 
government, local authorities as 'employers' and representatives of all the 
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teacher trade unions. It enables teachers to decline participation in a 
variety of activities within schools which are not directly related to the 
teaching activity in exchange for enlarged rolls in schools for workers with 
other skills. In effect, this attempt to engage teachers in the programme of 
reform was only partially successful since one large teacher organisation 
(the National Union of Teachers) declined to sign it and another (the 
National Association of Head Teachers) subsequently withdrew its 
support. Nevertheless it can be seen within a process of redefinition of 
teacher professionalism within a modernising framework. McCullogh 
comments: 
'Just as it (the New Labour government) aspired to 'modernise' 
other established features of the education system such as 
comprehensive schools (DfEE 1997), so it attempted to reinvent 
and re-position the ideal of teacher professionalism. No longer 
related principally to the curriculum domain or based on notions of 
autonomy and discretion, teacher professionalism was redefined 
in terms of improving the status, conditions and financial rewards 
of the more successful teachers in a more competitive 
environment' 
(McCullogh, in Phillips and Furlong, (ed), 2001, p. 1 12 - 3) 
This analysis reflects the Prime Minister's speech to the NAHT Annual 
Conference in Cardiff in June 1999: 
'The Government's objective is simple but highly ambitious. It is to 
restore teaching to its rightful place as one of Britain's foremost 
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professions.. - -recognising 
the need for a step-change in the 
reputation, rewards and image of teaching, raising it to the status 
of other professions such as medicine and law, which are natural 
choices for our most able graduates. I 
(Blair, 1999) 
McCullogh describes a 'modernised' professionalism in these terms. This 
professionalism would be: 
'very different from the past. It would make teachers responsible 
for improving standards for pupils, including those in socially 
disadvantaged areas. It would provide successful teachers with 
greater status and the most successful with higher salaries than 
they had received in the past. But it would bring penalties for those 
teachers and school principals who were unable or unwilling to 
rise to the challenge of raising standards as judged by 
examination results). 
(McCullogh in Phillips and Furlong, (ed), 2001, p. 1 13) 
The delivery of perceived, audited, improved performance would be the 
signature of the new professional teacher. Just as in its reforms of the 
secondary school system, Government had aimed at differentiation 
between schools and the creation of elites, so in reforms of the teaching 
profession it aimed at the creation of elite teachers. 
The WES 'Five Year Strategy for Children and Learners' (DfES, 2004(b)) 
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describes 'A New Teacher Professionalism II 
'in which career progression and financial rewards will go to those 
who are making the biggest contributions to improving pupil 
attainment, those who are continually developing their own 
expertise, and those who help to develop expertise in other 
I teachers . 
(DfES 2004(b), p66) 
On this 'career ladder', there are four main stages: teachers on the main 
pay scale; teachers who have crossed the pay 'threshold' by getting 
Senior Teacher status (within which there is also an upper pay scale). 
Excellent Teacher status; and beyond that Advanced Skills Teacher 
posts. Progression is not by service years. 'Some teachers will progress 
more quickly than others up this career ladder' (WES, 2004(b), p. 66). 
Given that there only limited places on the higher rungs of this ladder, 
some will not'progress' at all. 
Although technically employed by schools and Local Authorities, the 
underlying sense was of the creation of a national workforce. This was 
underpinned by the establishment of a national regulatory body, The 
General Teaching Council for England, by the establishment of a 
National College for School Leadership, and by the establishment of a 
national body to co-ordinate recruitment, the Teacher Training Agency. 
Alongside this, public recognition of perceived success through national 
awards for successful teachers and the use of the honours system to 
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knight headteachers for their transformational work in schools were part 
of a deliberate attempt to create a different professional culture, using 
public recognition focused upon outcomes as key to securing assent 
rather than participation: 
'A decisive system-wide advance' 
(WES, 2004(b), p. 44) 
A modernised teaching profession would be teaching in a modernised 
system of schools, particularly at secondary level. WES describes the 
'development of independent specialist schools in place of the traditional 
comprehensive' as a 'decisive system-wide advance'. In addition, the 
I modernising of every single part of the schools system' encompasses the 
abolition of nursery vouchers and the expansion of nursery education 
along with the establishment of Sure Start programmes for pre school 
children in deprived urban areas. This programme commenced in 1998 
and, by 2004,524 local programmes had been established. (DfES 2004(b) 
p20) 
Alongside, and in contrast to that inclusive agenda with the youngest 
children, can be cited the rapid expansion of specialist secondary schools 
and City Academies, the multiplication of admission authorities alongside a 
rhetoric of parental choice, and the reform of league tables of school 
performance by creating more of them, including measures of 'value 
added'. 
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At one level, these initiatives can be seen as contradictory in ideology, 
without a consistent positioning on the policy continuum which could be 
constructed between approaches based on collaboration or competition, 
between planned or choice based approaches to the design of delivery. 
Their unifying principle, however, is their intentional diversity, their 
absence of a fixed position on those issues. In this way, 'independent' 
schools can be described aswithin a specialist system', the conceptual 
and grammatical possibilities drawn from third way thinking being utilised 
within the WES policy description. 
Modernising the Local Authority role in education 
Just as 'modernisation' has sought to change the teaching profession 
and schools, so has it sought to reform local education authorities. The 
commitment to reform local government and the mechanisms for doing 
so were outlined early in the life of the incoming Labour Government. In 
1998, the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) published a 
pamphlet, Leading the Way -A new vision for local govemment by Rt. 
Hon. Tony Blair MP (Blair 1998). This was an early marker of 
government intentions, published in advance of formal consultative 
documents. This enabled the wider policy context to be laid out in a 
language which is more rhetorical than the formality of green or white 
papers and therefore more reflective of the political drive behind them. 
Blair argues that local government needs to modernise. The definition of 
the concept of 'modern' is not offered for debate in the pamphlet. What is 
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clear, however, is that the new government did not regard the structure 
and operation of local government as 'modern'. Those arrangements, 
however, were themselves the products of recent reform, both 
operationally as a consequence of the compulsory competitive tendering 
of certain services and structurally, most noticeably the creation of 
Unitary Authorities with education responsibilities. What is described in 
the pamphlet, however, are a number of areas in which local government 
is seriously defective, in the eyes of government. In responding to these 
defects in a way in which the government approves, local government 
will modernise itself and be allowed to claim ongoing legitimacy as a 
(junior) partner in the New Labour project. This change will however be 
subject to inspection and review by government agencies. Its success 
therefore will be at least as much defined by managerial tests as by 
democratic ones. 
Such an approach is clearly influenced by Giddens' analysis of the way 
forward for social democracies. In The Third Way he discusses 'The 
death of socialism' (Giddens, 1998, pp. 3 - 8), so-called, 'Old style social 
democracy' (pp8-1 1) and the rise of neo-liberalism, before offering an 
analysis of the 'third way programme' (p. 70) 
'The restructuring of government should follow the ecological 
principle of 'getting more for less', understood not as downsizing 
but as improving delivered value'. 
(Giddens, 1998, p. 74) 
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The key elements of New Labour's approach to the reform of local 
governance can be discerned here - the contrast of immobile 
bureaucracy with the flexibility of the private sector, the need for the 
improvement of delivered value, (a phrase caught in the process of 
evolution into 'best value'), and the relationship of legitimacy to 
efficiency. 
The Executive Summary of the IPPR pamphlet opens with the 
statement: 
'The government was elected with a bold mandate to modernise 
Britain and build a fairer, more decent society. To do that and to 
deliver its key pledges it needs the support of local government. 
Many Councils understand this and are working with local 
partners to place young people in jobs, raise standards in schools 
and cut crime. At its best local government is brilliant and cannot 
be bettered. But to play its full part in modernising Britain, local 
government itself needs to modernise. ' 
(Blair, 1998, p. 1). 
Even allowing for the condensed nature of an executive summary, the 
nature of this analysis as the foundation upon which to base a 
programme of reform is worth analysis since it starts to firm up the 
notion of modernisation in the developing thinking of New Labour in 
relation to local government. 
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First, although the pamphlet appears to assume it as a fact, it is not self- 
evident that the purpose of local government is to support central 
government. The notion of the local democratic mandate is part of the 
pluralist nature of British political life and the boundaries of power and 
influence between the central and various local government bodies are 
subject to constant renegotiation, particularly following a general election. 
However, the actions of some councils which laid heavy emphasis on the 
legitimacy of the local mandate as the basis for radical action, such as 
Liverpool City Council and the Greater London Council, had either 
embarrassed or enraged both major political parties during the 
Conservative administration. The role of local government therefore is to 
be 'supportive'. The modern Council is compliant and its aims are to be 
largely determined by the national mandate. 
Second, the examples which are cited, and therefore given approval, of 
successful working by councils are to a significant degree areas in which 
councils do not act alone or are not the lead body. 
The third example is that of raising standards in schools. The period 
since the 1988 Education Reform Act had been one of consistent 
reduction of the involvement of LEAs in the issue of quality. The definition 
of a core role for LEAs in that context had essentially related to those 
functions such as planning school places or organising school transport in 
which the interests of, or expertise in, the individual school would make it 
inappropriate for it to be done at school level. The inclusion in this 
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pamphlet Of Positive comment about the involvement of LEAs in quality 
issues relating to schools is significant. It begins to suggest the potential of 
a role for LEAs in school improvement, rather than in issues of sufficiency 
of places and transport. It signals an early perception that the existing 
strategies of school inspection and market style competition between 
institutions were unlikely to achieve, unaided, the policy aspirations of the 
new government and that the support of local government would be a 
potential contribution to their fulfilment. The modern council therefore may 
need to be skilled in acting in partnership with others and may have a role 
in fixing things locally if other processes have proved unsuccessful. 
The paper goes on to offer an analysis of why modernisation is needed: 
'Localities lack a clear sense of direction; most people have a 
sense of pride in where they live. They want to see everyone 
working together to make their town, estate or village a better 
place to live. But with so many agencies, businesses, groups and 
organisations now playing a part in local issues, it is often difficult 
to get everybody working to a common agenda. Localities 
deserve clearer vision and leadership. 
There is a lack of coherence and cohesion in delivering local 
services; the fragmentation of responsibilities between so many 
public agencies also affects the services local people receive. 
Sometimes these agencies work well together as a team. But 
sometimes co-operation gives way to conflict and local people 
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lose out. And even where the council runs the services, co- 
ordination between departments often leaves a lot to be desired. 
The quality of local services is too variable; the best of the public 
sector is excellent but too many public bodies are content with 
the mediocre. And sometimes things are so bad that the 
government has to intervene. ' 
(Blair, 1998, p. 6). 
From this analysis, the nature of the modern local authority is derived, 
that Councils should focus on their role as leaders of local communities 
by developing a clear vision for their locality, organising and supporting 
partnerships and guaranteeing quality services for all. 
As a definition of role, it is as significant for it omits as for what it 
includes. Fundamentally, what is being described is a role in which the 
direct delivery of a service or services to local communities is not central 
to the purpose of the local authority. Rather, the key words are about 
I vision II partnership' and the 'guarantee of quality'. The 'modern' local 
authority can be described separately from the services it historically 
provided. Their direct provision is therefore an optional activity. 
The nature of leadership which is prescribed does not rest in the 
pamphlet upon an explicit analysis of the relationship of leadership and 
authority. It does not explain the way in which a vision for the locality 
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largely divorced from the means of achieving it can have legitimacy. This 
leads to a characteristic gesture of modernisation regarding the notion of 
leadership. Blair looks to a vision of efficient, modernised councils, 
acting in support of national priorities to common quality standards. The 
vision of leadership is one that reflects priorities determined by national 
leaders, towards which local authorities help to lead their areas. 
However, other commentators advance different analyses of the nature 
of civic leadership. For example, Heifetz observes: 
' in a crisis we tend to look for the wrong kind of leadership. We 
call for someone with answers, decision, strength, and a map of 
the future, someone who knows where we ought to be going - in 
short someone who can make hard problems simple .) 
(Heifetz l 994, p. 2). 
He argues, however, that a desire for such leadership is misplaced. After 
describing a number of profoundly difficult social and economic issues, 
including in his American context poor public education, he observes 
that: 
'to meet challenges such as these, we need a different idea of 
leadership and a new social contract that promote our adaptive 
capacities, rather than inappropriate expectations of authority. We 
need to reconceive and revitalise our civic life and the meaning of 
I citizenship . 
(Hefeitz, 1994, p-2). 
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The Blair pamphlet does not deal with the notions of adaptive citizenship. 
In laying out a role for the local authority in community leadership which is 
conditional - both in its legitimacy and on judgements of its adequacy 
upon central government, rather than upon the judgements of local voters 
- the role for local government outlined in the pamphlet presents both an 
opportunity and a threat to local governance. The kind of role which is 
outlined seeks to reconcile the need the government perceives for a 
strong centre of local renewal, with the distrust of the local authority as a 
provider of services, and potential source of dissent. It follows therefore 
that leadership can only be demonstrated through partnership, rather than 
direct action. Quality of provision, rather than active, adaptive, citizenship, 
is to be the goal. 
Historically, however councils had seen service provision as their core 
function and had organised their political and management structures 
around such concerns, with Committees, for example, Housing, Social 
Services, Direct Labour (such as waste disposal) and Education. These 
have existed with their associate chairmanships, vice chairmanships, 
opposition spokespersons and officers, many reflecting local political 
standing and the creation of traditions of service. What was being 
proposed was not only a different operational future but also one with 
cultural values about what was important within an organisation rather 
different from that which largely existed. 
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Just as modernising the teaching profession required cultural change, 
with adherence to the values of performance rather than professional 
independence, so the modernising of local governance required cultural 
change, encouraging adherence to priorities of a central government. 
As the illustrative example of Coketown indicates, such cultural change 
was, for some authorities, impossible to achieve. 
The development of more sophisticated techniques of inspection and 
audit would underpin cultural change and reward adherence. Giddens 
indicated that effective auditing was a characteristic of effective business 
practice. (Giddens, 1998, p. 74 -75). This notion of the prevalence of 
audit, within both private and public spheres, was commented on by 
Power. He describes audit as a 'ritual of verification'. In this sense, 
I auditing is not merely a collection of technical tasks but also a 
programmatic idea circulating in organisational environments, an 
idea which promises a certain kind of control and organisational 
transparency'. 
(Power, 1997, p. 122). 
The effectiveness of the process of audit to achieve both transparency and 
control has been central to its place within the performance management 
of local authorities by central government. Power goes on, his language 
describing this process using theatrical metaphors: 
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'Auditing has the character of a certain kind of organisational script 
whose dramaturgical essence is the production of comfort I. 
(Power, 1997, p. 123) 
He makes distinctions between auditing and inspection, investigating the 
degree to which audit, like inspection, is essentially adversarial and 
exposes the tension between 'comforting' and 'criticising' in a way which 
has implications for the role of auditing and inspection as a basis for public 
policy: 
'The notion of inspection is ambiguous and slippery precisely 
because it may (and usually does) involve a mix of methods and 
styles; the pure or ideal inspectorate, which automatically enforces 
a set of norms or benchmarks, exists only in the textbooks'. 
(Power, 1997, p. 129). 
From this, Power identifies the significance of the development of self 
assessment as part of both audit and inspection processes: 
9 pressures for voluntary service improvement rather than external 
sanction have emerged as the primary corrective tool. Even though 
inspection practices may adopt more of this audit style in their mode 
of operation and may start to trust more in the self regulating 
capability of self regulating organisations, it is the existence of 
formal possibilities for independent escalation which marks an 
operational boundary between audit and inspection ). 
(Power, 1997, p. 132 italics in original) 
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The process of 'independent escalation', decided by central government, 
as well as forming the 'operational boundary between audit and 
inspection', also defines the capacity of the performance culture to 
change local government in general and, in its application through 
outsourcing, to change Local Education Authorities in particular. This 
possibility of independent escalation is a further characteristic of 
modernisation. Just as new ways to provide schooling were explored - 
through academies replacing failing schools, or performance 
management exposing the limitations of teachers - so inspection and 
intervention by government would be the incentive for voluntary 
improvement in local authorities. Such intervention would carry 
authorities closer to the role of enabler rather than provider of services in 
their localities. The drama of such activity, its public nature and the 
theatricality of intervention, form part of its power to enforce change. 
The business of education improvement 
Within a context in which the delivery of services has been established as 
an optional activity for local councils and replaced by options of 
procurement or brokering, and a system in which rituals for the verification 
of performance had been created, then the effectiveness of a Council's 
arrangements become the key criteria for judgements upon it. The 
decision on whether to deliver public services through directly employed 
public servants or through other means is one for local authorities to take, 
although there is some evidence that private sector provision may be seen 
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as in some ways preferable, or at least more 'modern I, by central 
government. 
As the WES Five Year Strategy indicates: 
'At all levels - under fives, primary, secondary and post-16 - Local 
Authorities should recast themselves as the commissioner and 
quality assurer of educational services, not the direct supplier, a 
role which enables them to promote the interests of parents and 
pupils far more confidently and powerfully than the old days of the 
Local Authority as direct manager of the local schools and 
colleges. ' 
(WES, 2004(b), para 48, p. 55) 
This 'commissioning' role is a description of the relationship between a 
council and a contractor in an outsourced LEA. Its advocacy by WES can 
be perceived in the actions of government. On 8 March 2005, the Chief 
Executives of Councils which are LEAs were invited by the Confederation 
for British Industry to a seminar on education issues. The keynote 
speech was by Stephen Twigg, then Minister of State for School 
Standards. The purpose of the event was 'to reflect on government policy 
on LEA market management and consider what lessons can be learnt for 
future policy' (letter of 8 March 2005 from Marie de Guzman, Head of 
Marketing, CBI Public Services Directorate). 
Sitting behind the invitation, and attached to the letter, was an unsigned 
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report, 'The business of education improvement: Raising LEA 
performance through competition' ( Copyright CBI 2005). This report 
claimed to discern improvement in pupil performance as measured by 
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) in the nine private sector outsourced 
LEAs in which there had been intervention, compared to control groups 
of all LEAs, eleven non-outsourced failing LEAs, a control group of LEAs 
that had similar education attainment levels in 2000 and a control group 
of LEAs that had 'similar levels of attainment and organisational 
dysfunction in 2000' (CBI, 2005, p. 25). 
The Executive Summary indicates that: 
- the nine private sector-outsourced LEAs improved more than the 
average of all LEAs in England; 
- the performance of the nine private sector-outsourced LEAs improved 
more than the average performance of the 11 failing non-outsourced 
LEAs: 
- the nine private sector outsourced LEAs improved more than LEAs 
that had similar low levels of educational attainment in 2000 
- the nine private sector-outsourced LEAs improved more than LEAs 
that had similarly low levels of educational attainment in 2000 and 
were failing as organisations. 
The one KPI where private sector interventions did less well than 
comparator groups was the number of pupils gaining one or more GCSE 
at A* to G. But the difference between comparator performances in every 
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case was less than one percentage point (CBl, 2005, p-5) 
The KPIs chosen for the research were: 
- Maths and English at Key Stage 2; 
- Maths, English and Science at Key Stage 3; 
- Pupils gaining five or more GCSEs at A* to C and 
- Pupils gaining one or more GCSE at A* to G. 
The report justifies this choice 'because they were the educational 
outcomes of most concern to the users of education services' CBI 2005 
p5) (although no evidence is given as to who these 'users' are, nor how 
their concerns were discerned). In the report, however, there is no 
information in relation, for example, to inclusion, to special needs, to 
exclusions or to value added measures. 
Nevertheless, the 'Operational analysis' concludes: 
'A combination of political will, decisive leadership, improved 
governance, effective contracting and performance management 
I contributed to the success of the intervention programme . 
(CBI, 2005, p. 5) 
The Appendix of the document gives the source information of these 
conclusions. The numerical data is given in tabular form, with the twenty 
'failing' LEAs listed alphabetically. The private sector out-sourced LEAs 
are not identified in the statistical analysis of percentage change in KPIs 
table, nor in the table of Annual Data for KPIs 2000 and 2004. There is 
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an additional table indicating the period of intervention arrangements and 
also the number of intervention years and months within the statistics 
period for the outsourced LEAs. 
The key claims - that improvement in the outsourced LEAs went ahead 
of other'failing' LEAs and the England average - rest presumably on the 
information on average KPI changes between 2000 and 2004. The 
relevant figures from the table are: 
Private sector/outsourced +3.6% 
Public partnership/non-outsourced +2.3% 
All 150 LEAs average +1.6% 
The nine private sector out-sourced LEAs include four from Inner London 
Boroughs: Hackney, Haringey, Islington and Southwark. None of the 
public partnership LEAs is in Inner London, although one - Redbridge - 
is in Outer London. Using the data in the document, comparing the rate 
of improvement of the Inner London LEAs with the other outsourced 
LEAs and with the other comparable 'intervention' non-inner London 
authorities gives the result below: 
Inner London out-sourced LEAs +4.55% 
Other out-sourced LEAs +2.3% 
Non-outsourced 'intervention' LEAs +2.3% 
All interventions +2.9% 
An alternative analysis of the statistical information in the report , 
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therefore, is not that out-sourcing is generally more effective than other 
interventions (which the report itself claims), but rather the more focused 
one that outsourcing in London has achieved a rate of improvement 
ahead of outsourcing elsewhere; that the rate of improvement in out- 
sourced and non-outsourced 'intervention' LEAs in the rest of England is 
identical; and that intervention generally has led to improvement ahead of 
the national average. Since no 'failing' Inner London Borough had a 
4 public partnership' or intervention other than through out-sourcing there 
can be no data comparing the effectiveness of out-sourcing in inner 
London with public partnership intervention in inner London. 
In the Executive summary, the report characterises itself as: 
'the first qualitative and quantitative analysis of the impact of 
government intervention in failing local education authorities 
(LEAs) using the private sector.... Its purpose is to provide an 
evidence-based assessment of the impact of government policy, 
the lessons learned and the implications for future policy 
objectives. 
The LEA services market has been chosen for this study because 
of the government's explicit policy objective of creating a new 
market in education services. At the time, the development of this 
new market was a radical and groundbreaking approach to 
tackling poor education performance. ' 
(CBI, 2005, p-5) 
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This indicates the underlying intention of the document. It is not 
fundamentally about trying to explain and understand government 
intervention: it is seeking to persuade the influential readership (who may 
well not get beyond its 'Executive' summary) of the virtues of private 
sector involvement. The need for this persuasion is given later in the 
document, described as 'Issues'. The document considers 'Intervention 
Policy' and concludes: 
'The government's early contribution was significant and 
innovative. It created the conditions within which an initial market 
could be established that actively encouraged new entrants into 
the market. 
But despite the initial success of the policy, the market in major 
LEA outsourcing has failed to move beyond early interventions. 
The government's belief that voluntary partnerships would emerge 
over time has proved to be misguided. 
The failure to develop the market beyond the initial intervention 
process stemmed, in part, from the apparent stigma associated 
with public-private partnerships (PPPs). Also significant was an 
underestimation of the cultural and political resistance from local 
authorities to a change in their role from direct providers to 
commissioners of services' 
(CBI, 2005, p. 6) 
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This analysis of the limited growth of the market does not recognise the 
degree to which public sector bodies changed their own behaviour in the 
new culture of performance and also became more focused upon 
outcomes. The degree to which the second round of the inspection 
process of LEAs by Ofsted failed to produce more candidates for 
outsourcing reflects that. Indeed, the inspection judgement of Coketown 
during that round of inspection was the best it received, along with a 
number of other LEAs. 
Nevertheless, the report identifies market development as a genuine 
issue for future policy development. At the 2004 National Audit Office 
PFI/PPP Conference in London on 22 June 2004, Chris Hyman, Chief 
Executive of Serco Group p1c, speaking on the topic of 'A Contractor's 
Perspective on Dealing with Change', began his presentation by saying: 
'Serco comes to this issue as a public service provider. More than 
90% of our business is with government. And unlike many of our 
competitors, we are often engaged in delivering front-line services 
across a wide range of sectors - health, education, justice, 
transport, science, defence and local government. 
We are engaged in close partnerships with government in 
managing Local Education Authorities at Bradford and Walsall 
(Hyman, 2004)) 
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He goes on to mention the range of other public sector interests of the 
company. In discussing issues around contracting, and in particular 
around bidding costs, he says: 
'Bid costs are eventually paid for by the customer and the taxpayer 
- either explicitly through a 'winner pays loser' mechanism (after 
which the winner adds it to their price) or indirectly through 
increases in the market's cost base.. I 
(Hyman, 2004) 
It follows from this that the outsourcing process can create a funding 
stream for private sector operations regardless of their success in 
winning contracts, not through delivering services but simply from being 
in the market and producing bids. The operation of this market, rather 
than reducing costs to the taxpayer, in fact increases them, since the 
costs of failed bids are eventually funded by the public sector alongside 
the service which is being procured. 
Another senior private sector manager, Kevin Beeston, Chairman of 
Serco Group p1c, speaking, at the 5 th Annual Public Private Partnerships 
Global Summit, held in Prague on 2 November 2004, on the topic of 'The 
Operator's Perspective on Risk and Uncertainty in Long-Term Contracts), 
reflected on a United Kingdom experience: 
'in the United Kingdom, we have two similar contracts to turn 
around failing public services. Contract A is performing 
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exceptionally well in terms of service outcomes and delivering 
acceptable returns; contract B is turning around more slowly, and 
for that reason is performing much less well in financial terms. 
The challenges are roughly the same. And the company is the 
same. What accounts for the difference in performance? 
The major difference, as we see it, lies in the structure of the 
contracts - Contract A uses a more flexible contracting model and 
performance regime compared to Contract B. 
For example, at Contract B, the performance measures were 
negotiated at a time when very little was known - on either side - 
about the delivery of the service in question, and they are set five 
years in advance. 
In the case of Contract A, only a small part of the service was 
contracted to begin with - although this was more by accident than 
design. But this enabled both parties to study the issues 
associated with performance improvement before writing the 
larger contract. Moreover, targets are set every year based on the 
previous year's perforrnance. ý 
(Beeston, 2004) 
Although Beeston does not name the contracts, it is reasonable to 
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speculate they are those named by Hyman during his speech in June. If 
this is the case, then Contract B may well be Bradford, and Contract A 
would therefore be Walsall. Comparing the position of those two 
outsourcing contracts using the data in the CBI report, the relative 
improvement in KPI performance is: 
Bradford - average of KPI changes 2000-04 +3.2% 
Walsall - average of KPI changes 2000-04 +2.0% 
Although in absolute terms, the Bradford improvement is greater, in 
contracting terms it is performing 'less well in financial terms'. Because of 
the nature of contract, more modest improvement can lead to 'acceptable 
returns'. It follows from this that the contracting process carries with its 
own set of incentives, not always attuned to optimum performance. It is 
also interesting that Beeston refers to 'both' parties negotiating the 
enlarged contract in Contract A, rather than the multiple range of partners 
and stakeholders - schools, officers, members, WES officials and 
ministers - one might presume to have been involved in the process. For 
the contractor, there is ultimately one client, in this case central 
government. Satisfying other partners may be the route to satisfying the 
client, but only if the contract makes that clear. 
Given the possibilities for the private sector within the business of 
education improvement, and their frustration with local authorities not 
entering into voluntary partnerships, the CBI makes a number of 
recommendations. 
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- Public service education markets need effective management 
-A capacity and enthusiasm for learning is crucial to sustained 
improvement 
Create incentives to support future strategies 
International competitiveness 
(CBI, 2005, p. 3) 
What is proposed is a series of interventions by DfES to secure the 
position of the private sector in the supply of LEA services, given new 
significance by the 'greater commissioning role for local 
authorities... implicit within the 2004 Children Act and the major 
programme of infrastructure renewal, Building Schools for the Future' 
(CBI, 2005, p. 6). 
These measures include extending the range of partnerships beyond 
failing authorities, providing incentives (both financial and regulatory) to 
encourage the use of private contractors, increasing the challenge to 
local authorities under the CPA regime and providing high profile support 
by ministers. 
The degree to which these recommendations will be enacted is as yet 
unclear. However, Public Servant on 28 January 2005 contained a story 
headlined, 'Private education sector spies business as Corry joins WES', 
referring to the secondment of Dan Corry to the WES from the New Local 
Government Network to work as a strategic adviser to the Education 
Secretary. Corry is quoted as saying: 
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'local government is not necessarily about delivering services, or 
even purchasing or funding them, but rather about influence and 
levers 
... through regulation, scrutiny and empowering local 
communitiesý. 
The process of shift in power and responsibility between partners in the 
education project, given impetus by Callaghan, appears likely to 
accelerate rather than slow down. Cory is advocating a position for local 
authorities in relation to the provision of services beyond that of the IPPR 
pamphlet and the policies which followed it. 
However, other changes, more profound in their implications for schools 
and local authorities are emerging from concerns which are neither 
directly related to the performance of schools nor to the efficiency of 
councils in their efforts to support them. 
The LEA is dead, long live the CSA! 
The headline, taken from an article in the Education Journal, issue 85, p6q 
refers to The Children Act (2004). The cumulative effects of a more or less 
exclusive focus on issues of performance within the education service has 
been paralleled by the development of another strand of thinking, given 
emphasis and direction by the national concerns following the death of 
Victoria Climbie. The resulting enquiry, and publication of the Green 
Paper, 'Every Child Matters' (WES, 2004(a)) led directly to The Children 
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Act (2004). As a consequence of The Children Act (2004), the requirement 
on local authorities with education and social services responsibilities to 
appoint suitable chief officers for both those roles is revoked. In its place is 
a duty to appoint a Director of Children's Services and a Director for Adult 
Social Services. Local Education Authorities become Children's Services 
Authorities and are required to identify a Lead Member for Children to 
carry local political responsibility for all matters within the Councilys 
responsibility for children and to seek to draw together other public, private 
and voluntary sector activity in that area. 
In the WES Five Year Strategy for Children and Learners, the outline of 
these proposals is discussed, perhaps puzzlingly, in Chapter 2, which 
deals with Early Years. It describes the Green Paper, 'Every Child 
Matters', as heralding 'a sea change in services for children' (WES, 
2004(b), Chapter 2, para. 31, p. 27) and therefore of significance for all 
children and young people up to the age of 19. 
There are profound discontinuities of thinking within the Strategy, so much 
so that it could be characterised as at least two, largely incompatible, 
strategies. This is clear even in the Foreword by the Secretary of State for 
Education and Skills - in which mention is made of Callaghan's Ruskin 
College speech in 1976 and the Great Debate which followed it, an 
interesting insight into the degree to which those events continue as a 
reference point in New Labour thinking. The Foreword calls for a system 
which is 'both freer and more diverse' (DfES, 2004(b), p. 4) but also one in 
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which 'the parts of the system are (and are seen as being) interlinked and 
interdependent (p. 5). The document sees the resolution of this apparent 
paradox as 'collaboration and partnership ), Isome local brokerage', both 
local government and local agencies offering 'leadership and strategic 
direction' and 'really smart accountability I. 
The issues are most polarised in relation to secondary education, where 
the Five Year Strategy envisages 'independent specialist schools in place 
of the traditional comprehensive -a decisive system-wide advance' (DfES, 
2004(b), Chapt. 4, para. 3 p. 44), 'More Academies, which operate as 
independent schools within the state system' and 'the creation of other 
new schools to meet parental demand' (para. 4). 'Successful and popular' 
(para. 19, p. 48) secondary schools will be able establish their own sixth 
forms and all secondary schools will be 'free to own their own land and 
buildings, manage their assets, employ their staff, improve their governing 
bodies, and establish or join charitable foundations to engage with outside 
partners' (para. 20, p. 48). This reduction of the system to its constituent 
elements - the individual schools - precisely enacts Chubb and Moe's 
prescription for successful schools in terms of their degree of separation 
from local authorities and assumes that the sum of their individual 
decisions will translate automatically into public good. In his Foreword, the 
Secretary of State indicates this will lead to the 'central characteristic' of 
this system being 'personalisation - so that the system fits to the individual 
rather than the individual having to fit to the system' (DfES, 2004(b), p. 4). 
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In this context, the role of the Local Authority is described in the Strategy., 
as 'to champion the interests of parents and pupils in their localities.... At 
all levels... Local Authorities should recast themselves as the 
commissioner and quality assurer of educational services, not the direct 
supplier.. '(Chapt. 4, para. 48, p. 55), reflecting the influence of CBI thinking 
on policy making. 
This Local Authority role is only loosely related to that outlined for 
Directors of Children's Services (and Lead Members, although they are 
omitted from the text of the Strategy) elsewhere in the document. The role 
there is to 'be responsible for all Local Authority children's services, while 
Children's Trusts will bring together social care, education and health to 
make sure that competing priorities no longer get in the way of the best 
deal for children (para-31, p. 27). Alongside this, 'There will be a duty 
placed on Local Authorities and others to co-operate to secure better 
outcomes for children. The key vehicle for doing this will be the Children's 
Trust' (para. 33, p. 27). 
As a consequence of the influence of the view that they should be 'free', 
schools are not included among those bodies with a duty to co-operate to 
secure better outcomes for children. Taking into account their 
independence within the new strategy, they clearly cannot be 
I commissioned' by a Director of Children's Services. The inescapable 
conclusion therefore is that, within the Strategy, schools are not seen as 
services for children. The role of Local Authorities, described as 
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'champions' of children but more likely, within this framework, as 
I petitioners' on their behalf, looks increasingly problematic. 
The territory to be inhabited by Children's Trusts is essentially that 
contested area where the responsibility of individual agencies either 
overlapped or did not meet. As such, the establishment of bodies - 
described as 'not new statutory bodies', but rather 'partnership bodies 
which give effect to the new duties to cooperate in promoting the well- 
being of all children' (insert panel p. 27) - does not of itself solve any 
uncertainties but rather gives rise to issues of governance, authority, 
accountability and professional practice, none of which are addressed in 
the Strategy document. Essentially, localities will need to find their own 
solutions to these complex matters by creating local accords, local 
structures (being described by government officials as 'Trust-like 
arrangements'), and new forms of professional practice. 
What is clearer is the assessment framework which will be used to test 
success or compliance. All Children's Services Authorities were obliged to 
submit an Annual Performance Assessment statement to Ofsted by the 
beginning of June 2005 to form the basis of the CPA judgements for 2005. 
In addition, a programme of inspections of Children's Services Authorities 
has been announced, ensuring that all CSAs are inspected on a four year 
cycle. 
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Just as the Ofsted inspection framework for Local Education Authorities 
changed to encompass greater self audit, so the developing framework for 
inspection of services for children requires Authorities to grade themselves 
on a four point scale, numbers 1 and 2 being in various degrees 
unsatisfactory, and 3 and 4 both being above average. The Strategy 
indicates that within the context of the 'new integrated inspection 
framework' there can be, where services are failing, 'decisive action to put 
them right'. Power's concept of 'independent escalation' is embodied in the 
new arrangements and could connect directly to the CBI's advice 
regarding the private sector's appetite for further involvement, either on a 
voluntary or directed basis. 
In this way, particular characteristics of the modernising project - 
assessment and inspection of public agencies, a distinction between 
responsibility for services and their provision, a further distancing of 
schools from local democratic structures and the possibility of intervention 
- are being carried forward into the new arrangements. The purposes 
however are broadened beyond assessed pupil attainment to include what 
are described as five outcomes for children - being healthy, staying safe, 
enjoying and achieving, making a positive contribution and achieving 
economic well-being. (WES, 2004(a)). As such, the issues to be 
addressed by Children's Services Authorities have a clearer and more 
compelling base than the pursuit of administrative efficiency. 
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Conclusion 
Connections and loose ends 
At the start of this undertaking, I was seeking to understand what I 
identified as a series of related questions related to modernisation: 
- whether it existed as a coherent policy beyond its rhetoric; 
- whether it had the capacity to produce transformation within an 
education service; 
- whether it was in reality 'new' or a re-presentation of earlier 
intentions and actions; and 
- whether modernisation was an active concept in the beliefs and 
actions of those performing within the framework it creates. 
In the light of this study, I have found that, overall, modernisation seeks to 
respond to issues in the English school system as identified and 
conceptualised in the debates about education policy in which Callaghan's 
Ruskin College speech was a key event. By accepting an analysis which 
identified issues of choice, utility and measurable performance as those 
which were central to the educational project, modernisation became 
inextricably linked to the policy initiatives which preceded it as government 
sought to reform the school system. In this way, there is more policy 
continuity than departure in the modernising project but to characterise it 
as 'more of the same'would be inaccurate. Crucially, it has left the basis of 
the management of the education service established under the Education 
Reform Act (1988) largely untouched. By doing that, modernisation has 
sought reform within the system rather than creating a new one. 
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However, the flexible theoretical base of third way political analysis has 
enabled New Labour to advance some of its intentions in radical ways. For 
example, the position of all secondary schools as a result of the Five Year 
Strategy will be more independent of local authorities than even the 
relatively few Grant Maintained schools were under the previous 
Conservative administration. Alongside this, while disbanding the 
associated Funding Agency for Schools, WES will virtually become such a 
body for all rather than for a minority of schools in England. These are 
extensions and variations on policy themes and administrative solutions, 
rather than profound new conceptualisations of the purpose of schooling 
and its provision. New Labour has continued with the logic of the 
inspections of LEAs with a programme of intervention to deal with their 
consequences. It has continued to regard local authorities with suspicion 
and to draw power from them towards appointed bodies and agencies and 
to individual schools. However, by making those choices, it has not 
pursued whole system change, either towards the withdrawal of the central 
state from provision and placing trust in markets, or towards detailed 
control of institutions from the centre. Rather, through a complex network 
of shifts in power and responsibility, inspection, performance management 
processes and intervention at institutional and local authority level, it has 
sought to make what is, essentially, the system inherited from the previous 
administration run better. 
Having said this, modernisation has sought different ends from these 
means. Competition and devolution have ceased to be ends in 
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themselves; they have become related to a stated set of intentions around 
social justice. Independent Specialist Schools will be expected to channel 
and use their freedom rather than simply to enjoy to it. Similarly, councils 
are offered opportunities to inhabit new territories around community 
leadership without that role being prescribed or confined by central 
direction. In policy terms, it has rediscovered the question of the cities and 
recognised that schools alone cannot solve them but can be part of that 
solution. The operation of intervention at local authority level, alongside 
wider local government changes, has provoked experimental approaches 
to governance, challenging local authorities to demonstrate effectiveness 
and engagement through the creation of new relationships with private 
sector companies. 
In these ways, I modernisation' has been a source of energy rather than a 
concept, a justification for change rather than its method. Because of this, 
inevitably, it has lacked the core identification with values which give 
ideologies their power and therefore it has lacked the capacity to engage. 
It has meant more to some than to others. 'Modernisers' have not always 
felt they were modernising; even some of its actors seem to have thought 
their parts were in other, earlier, plays. As a result it has, yet to achieve its 
own momentum at local level. The engagement with the private sector 
continues to be largely contingent upon failure rather than upon a 
conviction that it is, of itself, preferable. The experience of Coketown, 
where improvement followed intervention, offers only limited support to a 
view that it introduces a clearer focus upon performance and outcomes. 
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The central act of contracting became largely subverted by the partners to 
the contract. Public service values and the search for a common purpose 
reasserted themselves and displaced the intended performance culture. 
The changes flowing from The Children Act (2004) may prove to be more 
decisive in reforming the purposes of schools and their relationships with 
local authorities and government. Those changes do not have their roots 
in third way thinking, nor indeed in the prolonged attempts by government 
to resolve the question as to whether, in the education system, more, 
inevitably, means worse. Rather, their roots lie outside the education 
system and its preoccupation with 'standards'. They lie in the recognition 
that all of the public services have other, more profound, duties towards 
their populations. In particular, they are to ensure that no child in future 
dies such a death as that endured by Victoria Climbie. 
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